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Dzienkowski: Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics

ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING AND
THE DESIGN OF RULES OF ETHICS
John S. Dzienkowski*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of what American lawyers know about legal ethics comes
from the rules of professional responsibility. Law school courses are
organized around the Model Code of Professional Conduct ("Model
Code")' and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"
or "Rules") 2 (together, "Codes"), 3 a majority of states require that bar
applicants pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination
("MPRE"), 4 and the continuing education of lawyers often focuses on
application of the Codes and their state law variations.5 Even though the

* Dean John F. Sutton, Jr. Chair in Lawyering and the Legal Process & Professor of Law,
The University of Texas at Austin. I would like to thank Susan Fortney,. Bruce Green, Ronald C.
Minkoff, Robert Peroni, and Ted Schneyer for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also
would like to thank the University of Texas School of Law Foundation for its substantial research
support. I dedicate this Article to my mentor, co-author, and friend, Dean and Professor John F.
Sutton, Jr., who died at the age of 95 on April 19, 2013.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2012).
3. Most of the casebooks on professional responsibility cover the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct either through a topic-based approach, a rules-based approach, or a problemsbased approach. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHIcs (8th ed. 2009) (using an approach based upon topic organization); MORTIMER D.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS (9th ed. 2010) (using an approach based upon the
organization of the rules); THOMAS D. MORGAN, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (11 th ed. 2011) (using an approach
based upon the problems raising ethics issues in law practice).
4. See THE MPRE, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/aboutncbe-exams/mpre (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (describing the scope of the MPRE).
5. Many states require that ethics Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") presentations contain
material that discusses the codes of ethics. See, e.g., Rules of the Minnesota State Board of
EDUC.,
CONTINUING
LEGAL
BOARD
OF
Education, MINN.
Continuing
Legal
http://www.mbcle.state.mn.us/MBCLE/pages/userdocuments/CLE%20RULES%2072013%20booklet.pdf (last updated July 1, 2013) (showing that mandatory Minnesota CLE
requirements include ethics).
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Rules expressly seek to limit their application,6 courts routinely rely
upon the Codes for analysis and answers to problems about conflicts of
interest, candor to the court, and other ethical issues.7
As a model code that states are to follow, the Model Code and the
Model Rules have been widely adopted and influential in shaping the
regulation of American lawyers.8 Essentially, the American Bar
Association ("ABA") has set the agenda for debate at both the state and
federal levels for how governing bodies should choose to regulate
lawyers. As a voluntary group of lawyers, 9 the ABA has become a
dominant force in establishing and maintaining lawyer self-regulation. 0
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope (2012).
7. See Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules Are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38
ST. MARY'S L.J. 929, 939-40 (2007); Note, The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal
Malpractice:Erasinga Double Standard, 109 HAP v. L. REv. 1102, 1104-05 (1996).
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT (2012). The Model Code was adopted by states in a shorter period of time after its
approval by the ABA House of Delegates and with fewer variations than the Model Rules. See
GILLERS, supra note 3, at 10. However, the vast majority of states have patterned their ethics rules
to a significant extent after the Model Rules. Id.
9. About the ABA, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about-the aba.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2013). Even though ABA membership is voluntary, many lawyers and judges involved in
regulating lawyers on a state level choose to become involved in the ABA efforts at the national
level. See News Release, ABA, Delegations from 37 State-Level Jurisdictions Combine Forces to
Preserve Justice Systems as the 'Business of Government' (Apr. 16, 2009), available
at
http://www.apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media/release/news-release.cftn?releaseid=642
(discussing ABA members convening nationally to address government reform). Of course, it
would make sense that lawyers interested in regulation also become involved on a national stage.
Additionally, the ABA has sought the involvement of many key players in their regulatory efforts.
Id. (listing Justice O'Connor as well as others as participants of ABA efforts). Moreover, the ABA
is a key source of information for many of the states. See About the ABA, supra.
10. This dominant position arises, in part, from the fact that the ABA became involved in
drafting codes so early in the history of codes. See Richmond, supra note 7, at 935 (discussing the
ABA adoption of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908 and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1970). Although it was not the first body to develop ethics codes, it did realize
soon thereafter the value of such codes in establishing self-regulation. See id at 935-36. The ABA
also sought to update the Canons of Professional Conduct on a regular basis and reacted to
criticisms of the Canons in establishing several committees to revise the Canons. Id. Eventually, an
ABA committee drafted the Model Code. Id. at 935. Many states deferred to the ABA simply
because they did not have the resources to draft different standards and because the arguments for
uniformity were persuasive. Interestingly, over the years, three large states, New York, California,
and Texas, departed from the ABA in significant ways. See Press Release, N.Y. State Courts, New
Attorney Rules of Professional Conduct Announced (Dec. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/press/pr2008_7.shtml (announcing New York's adoption of new
Disciplinary Rules and a "transition to the ABA Model Rules format"); About the Model Rules,
ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model-rules-of
_professional conduct.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (noting California as the only state with
rules of professional conduct that do not follow the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct);
Status
of State Review
of Professional Conduct Rules,
ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_statuschart.authcheck
dam.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (showing that Texas did not adopt the revised Model Rules).
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Despite its success in influencing rules that govern the profession,
in recent years the ABA has had difficulty in effecting revision of the
Rules to account for changes in law practice. Many of the Model Rules
have largely remained static for three decades despite the fact that
modem law practice has changed dramatically in this time period for all
lawyers. In 2009, the ABA empowered a commission to review the
Model Rules in light of the changes in the profession, but the
commission's efforts have been criticized as failing to address many of
the fundamental ethical problems of the twenty-first century. 1
It is important to acknowledge that law, as a profession, is difficult
to regulate because of the nature of lawyering, the different interests at
stake in many legal representations, and the agency relationship that
lawyers hold with respect to each of their clients. Attempts to regulate
such fluid relationships must necessarily be flexible enough to
accommodate differences in the facts of each case, but precise enough to
offer lawyers substantive and concrete guidance. The profession's
adherence to several core values of lawyering helps to inform the Model
Rules, 12 but, in the end, many provisions are the result of a careful
compromise between applying those core values and taking into account
various competing considerations such as facilitating client choice and
lawyers' ability to have economically viable law practices.
The problems inherent in today's Rules can be divided into several
broad categories. First, the Rules do not properly take into account the
fact that many functions of a modem lawyer no longer fit within the
traditional model of zealous advocacy.13 Lawyers and clients work in a
hybrid adversary system, yet many Rules assume that lawyers continue
to be bound to a duty of zealous advocacy. Second, the very nature of4
lawyering encourages lawyers to interpret ethical rules to their benefit.'
This adversarial interpretation of ethics codes leads to disparate answers
However, in recent years, each of these states has taken steps to conform its legal ethics rules to the
ABA standards.
11. See generally Letter from Thomas D. Morgan, Professor, George Wash. Univ. Sch. of
Law, to ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics2020 comments/morgan alpsdiscussiondraft.a
uthcheckdam.pdf (discussing the view that law practice is now institutional and not individual);
Joan C. Rogers, Ethics 20/20 Commission Airs Proposalson Conflicts-Checking, Choice of Rules
Pacts, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bna.com/ethics-2020-commissionn 12884903471 (discussing an interview with Anthony E. Davis, Esq. about the limited scope of the
Ethics 20/20 Commission's recommendations).
12. See James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A
"Radical" Proposalto Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 1159, 1186-90 (2000) (describing core values of lawyering).
13. See discussion infra Part IHI.A.
14. See discussion infra Part 1I.B.
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to identical ethics problems. The drafters need to be mindful of such
interpretative approaches when they write an ethics rule to narrow the
range of possible outcomes from reading the language of the particular
rule. Third, the economic pressures of law practice affect how lawyers
choose to interpret the Rules.' 5 A well-designed system of regulation
must necessarily take such pressures into account. Finally, the lack of
effective enforcement mechanisms for a vast majority of the Rules
affects compliance.16 If lawyers are unlikely to face consequences for the
violation of a rule, they may choose a path of noncompliance if that path
achieves other goals in their practice of law.
Despite the ABA's success in promulgating three ethics Codes that
achieved wide acceptance, its structure for making changes to the Codes
has proven unworkable and ineffective as a vehicle for adopting broadbased reform. Some have advocated for other bodies to become involved
in the broad-based regulation of the legal profession. 17 However,
Congress, state legislatures, and other agencies simply do not offer
viable options for comprehensive, rather than piecemeal, regulation of
lawyers.' 8 And, unfortunately, with fifty states and the District of
Columbia involved in regulating lawyers in the United States at the state
level, it is difficult for states to adopt fundamental reforms of the legal
profession that have a nationwide effect. Thus, the ABA, despite
its problems, continues to be the only viable option for reforming
the regulation of the profession. This Article argues that the ABA
should rethink the manner in which it drafts, considers, and promulgates
ethical rules.' 9
Part II of this Article examines the origin of the ABA Codes and
focuses, in particular, upon issues relevant to how such Codes were
drafted. Part III examines the specific problems that exist in the current

15. See discussion infra Part III.C.
16. See discussion infra Part HI.D.
17. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, An InstitutionalAnalysis ofLawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts,Legislatures or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167
(2003) (comparing and contrasting the bodies that currently regulate lawyers to other institutions
that could regulate lawyers).
18. In some specialized areas of practice such as tax law, the regulatory agencies have
developed their own contextual rules for regulating practitioners. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2012). And,
lawyers in the banking and securities areas are governed by laws and regulations enacted by
Congress and promulgated by federal administrative agency regulators. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1
(2012). However, for a variety of reasons, a national system for regulating all lawyers in general is
unlikely to develop at the federal level at this time.
19. For another scholar's views on this topic, see Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for
Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365 (2013)
[hereinafter Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers] (discussing how professional responsibility
rules for lawyers should be improved).
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Model Rules. Part IV presents several modest suggestions for improving
the design of ethics codes. Some of those suggestions relate to
restructuring the way in which the ABA considers, drafts, and
promulgates ethics rules. This Part then examines how such a
rulemaking process could focus on clarifying concepts in the Model
Rules that are important for their application. The drafting process must
more clearly focus on the interests at stake and anticipate how such rules
will be interpreted and enforced. In addition, the ABA must make
serious efforts to obtain empirical data about the operation of the current
Rules, the existence of law firm practices that cause harm to clients,
third parties, or the legal system, and the mechanisms used by firms to
comply with the Rules. Taking into account such data would improve
the drafting, deliberation, and rulemaking processes of the ABA.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CURRENT RULES

Many scholars have written excellent works on the history of the
regulation of lawyers in the United States and around the world. This
Article will focus only on the historical background that is important to
identifying various aspects of the problems that exist today regarding the
implementation of the Codes.
A.

Early Beginnings

As a group seeking to expand its power over the legal profession,
the ABA viewed the promulgation of codes as a core function in leading
the states into the regulation of lawyers. 20 The primary purpose for
regulating lawyers was to establish a system that would ultimately
protect the public-consumers of legal services. 21 Thus, the ABA
became involved in the way in which individuals entered the legal
profession by controlling educational standards and requirements for bar
membership. 22 It also became involved in establishing a state-by-state
system for controlling the practice of law.23 This decentralized approach
was more manageable and allowed the ABA to influence and address the
states' need for guidance. The ABA also became involved in regulating
20. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 46-47 (1989); Richard L. Abel, Why Does
the ABA PromulgateEthical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 640-41 (1981).
21. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Profession and Its
Reform, 68 TEX. L. REV. 451, 483 (1989) [hereinafter Dzienkowski, Regulation of the American
Legal Profession] (reviewing ABEL, supranote 20).
22. See id. at 461. A key feature to this control was the establishment of integrated bar
associations, whereby all lawyers in a jurisdiction had to become a member of the bar. ABEL, supra
note 20, at 46.
23. See ABEL, supranote 20, at 49.
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the manner in which lawyers practiced law and the way in which states
established disciplinary systems. 4 By controlling entry and influencing
the delivery of legal services, as well as the discipline of lawyers, the
ABA managed to establish a system of regulation for professionals that
the ruling powers in the states largely were willing to adopt. And,
in a sense, this system of self-regulation had the effect of forestalling
other governmental entities from becoming involved in the regulation
of lawyers.
Many scholars have examined the reasons why a profession seeks
to regulate itself. Those who rely on the Weberian approach to market
regulation explain acts of a profession under a view of controlling
AB has long sought to manage competitive
competition. 26 The ABA
pressures within the legal profession under the belief that everyone
(including clients) would be better off in such a system. 7 Some of these
acts included efforts to limit the number of practicing lawyers, efforts to
limit lawyers to geographic boundaries, efforts to establish minimum
price control, and efforts to keep nonlawyers out of quasi areas of law
practice. 8 Of course, many of these acts have been criticized as
anticompetitive and have been dismantled over time. 9
The dominance of the Codes was central to the ABA's goal of
controlling lawyers. The ABA, in essence, did the work for the state bar
authorities, and the general concept of uniformity was so appealing to
the states that eventually the ABA models developed a life of their own.
These models set the agenda for how states chose to regulate the lawyers
within their borders.
B. From the Canons to the Code to the Model Rules
Much has been written about the history of the drafting of the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics, 30 the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, 31 and the Model Rules. 32 Key individuals involved in the

24. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 1 (2002);
STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY & DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 1.1 (1979).

25.
(1992).
26.
27.
28.
29.

David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv 799, 810 n.36

30.

CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908); see generally, e.g., James M. Altman, Considering the

See ABEL, supranote 20, at 15, 49.
See Dzienkowski, Regulation of the American Legal Profession, supranote 21, at 454-57.
See id. at 460-61, 465-68.
Seeid. at461-62, 467.

A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (2003) (discussing the history of the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics).
31. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969); see generally, e.g., John F. Sutton, Jr.,
The American Bar Association Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEx. L.
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drafting process played important roles in shaping these documents, and
in addressing the needs of the profession at the time of their drafting.
The original thirty-two Canons began as an attempt to state the core
values of lawyering and to prohibit clearly wrongful conduct.33
Additions to those Canons demonstrated that the profession sought many
answers to basic questions of ethics. Between 1908 and 1969, the ABA
added Canons 33 through 47.34 And, as those additions continued to
delineate clear guidelines for conduct, the ABA realized that a change
was needed in order to more methodically address ethics issues that
arose in the practice of law.35
Beginning in 1924, the ABA created four committees to study the
1908 Canons and to propose a revision.36 Those committees found
deficiencies in the existing ABA Model Code, but could not formulate
concrete proposals to replace the Canons.37 In 1964, a fifth committee
was formed to evaluate the Canons and to provide guidance on how they
could be reformed.38 That committee, known as the Wright Committee
for its chair, Edward Wright, first presented the ABA House of
Delegates with a short critique of the Canons in 1965, but then went on
to reorganize and improve the structure of the document. 39 That effort
expanded into the complete drafting of an entirely new code, known as
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.4 °

REV. 255 (1970) (discussing the history of the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
32. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1429, 1443-49 (2004) (discussing the development and evolution
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We
Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 245-75 (1985)
[hereinafter Gillers, A Critical View of the Model Rules] (discussing the development of the Model
Rules and criticizing those Rules as lawyer-centered, rather than client-centered).
33. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 399 (John S.
Dzienkowski ed., abr. ed. 2013-2014) [hereinafter STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES]. Canon 33
addressed the topic of "Partnerships-Names," Canon 38 dealt with "Compensation, Commissions
and Rebates" from third persons, and Canon 41 covered "Discovery of Imposition and Deception,"
where a lawyer discovers fraud and deception. See id. at 407, 409.
34. Id. at 399.
35. Geoffrey Hazard viewed the profession's movement from the 1908 Canons to the 1969
Model Code as a significant legalization and transformation of ethical norms. See Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251-52 (1991).
36. Edward L. Wright, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Its History and Objectives,
24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1970) (describing the four efforts to revise the Canons).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 4.
39. See Judith L. Maute, Pre-Paidand Group Legal Services: Thirty Years After the Storm,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 919 (2001); Wright, supranote 36, at 4-7.
40. See Wright, supra note 36, at 6; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
(1969).
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The 1969 Model Code was a document drafted primarily by
litigators, but it purported to contain rules that apply to all areas of
practice. 41 And, the advocates used their skills to clearly set forth many
of their best practices. The Model Code reflected the view of Dean John
F. Sutton, the Model Code's Reporter, that pronouncements should be
classified into broad principles in the form of canons, mandatory
disciplinary rules, and aspirational concepts called "ethical
considerations. '' 2 In part, this was a philosophical stance, but it also
reflected a belief that classifying rules into categories would make them
easier to draft and enforce.43 This belief was grounded in the view that
the profession should be able to define standards of practice that are
distinct from standards used in tort cases and in regulating lawyers in
court. And, many of the concepts introduced in the Model Code were
accompanied by detailed footnotes and citations so that scholars and
lawyers could gain a better understanding of what the drafters meant in
the text. 44
The drafters of the Model Code made substantial progress in
defining standards of practice. The disciplinary rules and ethical
considerations under Canon 7's advocacy material were extremely
detailed and progressive.45 Canon 5's discussion of independent
professional judgment and the details under the disciplinary rules and
ethical considerations similarly addressed several bright-line attorney
conflicts situations that had not been previously regulated.46 The Model
Code also served as a document that permitted percolation of different
viewpoints throughout the states. It also demonstrated to the ABA that
even a radical departure from the 1908 Canons could be successfully
implemented, and the ABA could persuade the states to adopt this Code.
Once it became clear that text from all three categories-Canons,
Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical Considerations-would end up being
used outside of the regulatory and disciplinary process, however, the

41. The Model Code did not have many provisions directed at non-litigation practices. See
Andrews, supra note 31, at 1445-46. Thus, the Model Rules were later described as a document that
took into account the other non-litigation roles of lawyers in our society. See id. at 1447.
42. John Sutton, the reporter for the Model Code, firmly believed that a code for regulating
lawyers needed more than just bright-line rules. See John F. Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of
ProfessionalEthics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132, 134 (1966). Rather, in his view,
the Code needed aspirational standards that set forth core principles. See id. at 137-39.
43. See generally John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller,the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37
S. TEX. L. REV. 303 (1996) (arguing that the structure of the Model Code was influenced by the
jurisprudence scholarship of Lon Fuller).
44. Wright, supra note 36, at 2.
45.

STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at 362-83.

46. See id.
at 350-60.
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Model Code became unworkable as a code of legal ethics.47 Two Canons
were particularly troublesome and subject to overly broad
interpretations. Canon 7 required lawyers to represent their clients
"zealously within the bounds of the law,' ' S and Canon 9 required
lawyers to "avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. ' 49
The expansive language used in both Canon 7 and Canon 9 caused much
concern because such standards had the potential to be used outside of
the context of lawyer discipline.
In 1977, the ABA formed what became known as the Kutak
Commission to consider a revision of the Model Code, which had gone
into effect just seven years earlier.5 ° Professor Ted Schneyer has argued
that the rush to propose a new set of rules was related to the litigation
defeats that the ABA had suffered in the Supreme Court on the
prohibitions against lawyer advertising, and the states' resistance to
adopting ABA interim changes to the Model Code.5 1 Clearly, the
ABA sought to change the Model Code in a process that would
overcome the objections that had developed to a widely adopted system
of regulation.52
The drafters of the Model Rules turned to the familiar text and
comment approach used in model statutes and restatements. The text
was binding and the commentary was explanatory, enabling many of the
broader concepts to be put into comments.53 The Model Rules appeared
to set clearer standards for lawyer conduct, but the clarity was elusive as
many concepts were never defined. By leaving the definitions out, the
ABA, in a sense, left much to the state courts and disciplinary authorities
to interpret and decide in ultimately applying the Rules.
The Model Rules' Reporter, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, was a
force in making many of the decisions that were designed to solve the

47. One could argue that the judicial use of the Model Code to disqualify law firms involved
in conflicts of interest was a death knell for the Canons and Ethical Considerations. However,
Canon 9's requirement that lawyers should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety
also caused concern once the Code's language was used outside of the disciplinary context. See Ted
Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics:The Making of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,
14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 688-89 (1989) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professionalism].
48. STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at 362.
49. Id.at 386.
50. See Schneyer, Professionalism,supranote 47, at 688.
51. See id. at 688-90.
52. See id at 693-94 (noting that the major difference in the composition of the Kutak
Commission and the Wright Committee was the reduced representation of sole practitioners and
members of the American College of Trial Lawyers).
53.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope (2012) ("Comments do not add obligations

to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.").
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problems found in the Model Code.54 Some of those problems were dealt
with explicitly, but others, such as the need to temper the duty of zeal,
were not directly addressed, thus leaving a gap in enforcement. Although
these decisions may have been warranted as a response to the Model
Code, they continue to exist in the current enforcement mechanisms and
they impose significant costs on the system.
The Model Rules' structure for the conflicts of interest rules was
innovative and comprehensive.55 The introduction of a lawyer as
intermediary came from Hazard's work on the Brandeis confirmation
hearings and similarly addressed a novel role of the lawyer that Hazard
thought would benefit clients.56 In some provisions, the Model Rules
contained vague language but the choices could be viewed as transitional
to a new regulatory structure. Some scholars, however, viewed the
Model Rules as too lawyer-centric and thus failing to serve the function
of protecting the interests of clients.57
During the drafting and adoption process, the American Trial
Lawyers Association objected to the way in which the new Rules
expressly rejected some of the advocacy concepts contained in the
Model Code. 58 These objections were so strong that it caused them to
draft an alternative code. 59 However, this battle was short lived, as the
objections did not gain traction in the subsequent deliberations regarding
the adoption of the Model Rules in the states. 60 Although eventually a
majority of states did revise their state codes to conform to the Model
Rules, this process took longer than that of the Model Code, and many
states refused to adopt the exact language of the new Model Rules.61

54. See David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 46-47 (1995) (describing the influence of Professor Hazard on the
Kutak Commission).
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012) (outlining present client conflicts);
id. R. 1.8 (outlining prohibited transactions); id. R. 1.9 (outlining former client conflicts); id. R. 1.10
(outlining imputed disqualification); id. R. L. 1 (outlining government lawyer conflicts); id. R. 1.12
(outlining conflicts involving judges and similar officers).
56. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58, 60-62, 64 (1978).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (1983), containing the lawyer as intermediary
provisions, was repealed by the ABA in 2002. For a comprehensive discussion of the lawyer as
intermediary concept, see generally John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The
Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741.
57. See Gillers, A Critical View of the Model Rules, supra note 32, at 245 (noting that the
Model Rules is "an astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers over
clients, other persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line, paragraph, and
provision that permits significant choice").
58. See Schneyer, Professionalism,supra note 47, at 684, 7 10-12.
59. Id.at710.
60. Id. at 691 n.76.
61. See id.
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C. The Model Rules and Beyond
At some point, the ABA realized that modernization of the Model
Rules would prove to be a complicated task. As a model for states to
adopt, the Model Code had been a major success. 6622 The Model Rules
experiment, by contrast, demonstrated that implementing uniform
change across the states from that point on would be difficult to
accomplish. Variance in language across jurisdictions inevitably leads
to a patchwork of different rules throughout the United States. And,
given that many federal courts deferred to state ethics rules,
further complications result when standards of ethics vary across
the jurisdictions.63
Initially, the ABA decided that the Model Rules would become a
living document that would be modified by the ABA House of Delegates
when changes were needed. 64 Of the first fifteen years after the adoption
of the Model Rules, the ABA made changes in five of those years.65
Most of the changes related to modifications of comments, but in one
case, sale of a law practice, a new rule was adopted.66 This piecemeal
approach made the passage of amendments a more routine task for the
ABA.67 But, the problem with the piecemeal approach is that few of
those minor amendments were adopted by many (let alone a majority) of
the states until the ABA completed a major revision of the Model Rules
in 2002.68
Efforts to revise the Model Rules between 1983 and 1997 provide
an instructive perspective on the ABA's ability to implement
fundamental reform. In 1990, the ABA House of Delegates considered
and adopted a new Model Rule 1.17 on the sale of a law practice.6 9 In
many jurisdictions at that time, lawyers were not permitted to sell their
law practice. 70 However, lawyers would effectively transfer their client
62.

See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 56-57 (1986); see also W.
10 (3d ed.

BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS

2011).
63.

See, e.g., Ryan E. Mick, The FederalProsecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution, 85

IOWA L. REv. 1251, 1286-87 (2001) (discussing deviations in the no-contact rule across state lines).
64.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface (2012).

65. See id.
66. See STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at 55-56 (citing MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2012)).
67. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface (2012).

68. See id; Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct ("Ethics 2000"), chair's
intro. Although a piecemeal modification process was easy to accomplish for an ABA that had two
meetings each year and many standing committees, state supreme courts and bar authorities did not
have mechanisms in place to make annual changes to their rules.
69. See STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supranote 33, at 61.
70. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (announcing
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workload to other lawyers by bringing on additional partners and by
retiring and receiving compensation through a plan implemented upon
retirement.] One major reason to allow lawyers to sell a law practice
was the detrimental effect of the old rule upon solo practitioners.7 2
Rule 1.17 addressed the important topics of notice to clients and the
conditions upon which such a sale was permissible to implement some
significant reform.73 Many states considered Rule 1.17 and adopted
some variation of it even before the Ethics 2000 Commission ("Ethics
2000") created its version of the Model Rules.74 However, many states
made significant variations to the text of this Rule.75 Thus, although
fundamental reform by the ABA House of Delegates was accomplished,
the ABA's success in establishing a national standard was mixed as the
variations at the state level are significant. One could speculate whether
the state variations would be as substantial if the Rule had been
introduced at the time of Ethics 2000, when the entirety of the Model
Rules was subject to review.
In 1991, the ABA House of Delegates rejected an effort to amend
the confidentiality rule, Rule 1.6, permitting disclosure of client
information to prevent a financial crime or fraud.76 This proposal was
similar to one rejected in 1982 when the House considered the adoption
of the Model Rules.77 Despite the fact that a majority of states permitted
disclosure in such situations, the drafters of the ethics Codes could not
persuade the ABA House of Delegates to adopt the provision at this

that the practice of law is not a business or commercial enterprise to be bought or sold); see
generally Stephen E. Kalish, The Sale ofa Law Practice: The Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct
Point in a New Direction, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 471 (1985) (arguing for a change in the prohibition
against the sale of a law practice).
71. Kalish, supra note 70, at 473 (using an example to show how lawyers could effectively
sell a law practice under existing ethics rules).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.17 cmt. (2012). It is important to note that
uniformity is less important with a rule directed at the issue of whether law firms practicing within
the borders of the jurisdiction can be bought and sold than, for example, with the topic of conflicts
rules in general. However, lack of uniformity still creates transaction costs in that lawyers must
interpret language that has little or no counterpart in other jurisdictions.
73. Seeid. R.1.17.
74. By 1997, thirty-seven states had adopted a version of this Rule. See generally John H.
Maville, Sale of a Law Practice:Out of the Shadows and into the Rules, ILL. B.J., June 2003, at 292
(discussing the consequences of the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to adopt Model Rule 1.17).
75. Variations of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional-responsibility/mrpc_ 17_17
.authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Sept. 6, 2012) (examining the versions of Rule 1.17 adopted by the
states).
76. See STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at 1098.
77. See id.
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time.78 The ABA leadership did not want to impose a national standard
of permissive disclosure in the area of financial crimes and frauds.79
In 1991, the ABA House of Delegates added a new Rule addressing
lawyer involvement in providing clients with ancillary business
practices.80 The new provision prohibited lawyers from offering such
services to non-clients, and such services had to be related to the legal
services provided to the lawyer's clients. 81 The new provision, which
effectively banned many existing ancillary practices, created so much
controversy that the ABA repealed the rule in August 1992.82 In 1994,
the ABA added a new Rule 5.7 that broadened the ability of lawyers to
offer ancillary business services to clients and essentially gave lawyers a
choice whether such services would fall within the protection of the
Model Rules.83 The new provision left open many questions about
disclosure to clients because of the recognition that lawyers wanted to be
free to offer ancillary services to clients and non-clients.84 The original
provision was enacted without any serious study of existing practices
and reflected a reaction against large firm involvement in ancillary
businesses. 85 Once it became clear that the Rule was ill-advised, in the
revision, the ABA chose to stay silent on some key questions rather than
to confront them directly.8 6
78. See id.
79. See id. In later years, all of the opposition in the ABA had to bow to pressure from
Congress and the SEC to modify the confidentiality rules after it became clear that lawyers had
participated in various well-publicized corporate frauds. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (2012) (reflecting that the Model Rules now includes language permitting disclosure of a crime
or fraud).
80. Henry J. Reske & Don J. DeBenedictus, Ethics Proposal Draws Fire. House Restricts
Ancillary Businesses,Rejects Confidentiality Change, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 34, 34.
81. See id.
82. Don J. DeBenedictus, House of Delegates: Close Vote Rescinds Provision Against
Ancillary Business, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 110, 110; see generally Ted Schneyer, Policymaking
and the Perils of Professionalism:The ABA's Ancillary Business Debateas a Case Study, 35 ARIz.
L. REV. 363 (1993) [hereinafter Schneyer, Policymaking] (examining the arguments for and against
ancillary business practices and, in particular, the strained use of professionalism to justify
policymaking).
83. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2012).
84. See Schneyer, Policymaking, supranote 82, at 376-77.
85. See id at 367-70. Professor Schneyer examines in detail the lobbying efforts of the
litigation section that led to the passage of the original Rule 5.7. See id. at 364-66. This case study
casts the policymaking role of the ABA as seriously flawed on an important issue that relates to
client services. See id. This debate did not in any way focus on the true protection of client interests,
but instead was lawyer-centered in its approach.
86. Rule 5.7 does not discuss whether lawyers who own an ancillary business practice must
disclose the extent of ownership to their clients. See id. at 376-77. It also does not address how a
law firm should handle referrals of non-law clients of the ancillary business to the law firm. And, it
does not require the firm to warn the client that checking competing ancillary service providers
might produce less expensive services or higher quality services.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 15

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:55

In 1997, the ABA appointed the Ethics 2000 Commission with a
charge to modernize the Model Rules and examine the growing disparity
in the states' ethics rules, the lack of clarity in some existing Rules, and
changes in technology and in law firm organization.87 During this time,
the ABA had also created a task force to address lawyer involvement in
corporate scandals and a commission to address multijurisdictional
practice of law.88
The drafters of the Ethics 2000 revision, led by Professor Nancy
Moore as the Chief Reporter, did a methodical substantive review of the
Rules and, ultimately, made many important changes. First, the revisions
included major changes to the conflicts of interest rules. 89 Rule 1.7 was
redrafted, and Rule 2.2 was deleted and the subject was placed in the
comments to the revised Rule 1.7.90 A comment on advanced consent
was added to the conflicts of interest rule. 91 The drafters removed
automatic imputation of personal conflicts to the other lawyers in the
law firm. 92 And, Rule 6.5 permitted lawyers to offer limited legal
services in pro bono clinics without having to perform conflicts checks. 93
Second, the concept of "informed consent, confirmed in writing" was
introduced to many of the rules.94 Finally, the drafters added substantial
clarity to the Rules with an expanded definitional section and with
additional commentary throughout the document.95 The Ethics 2000
efforts to implement substantial reform were very successful as forty-six
states adopted a majority of the changes proposed by Ethics 2000.96 Of
course, the success was not uniform. Some states, such as Texas, took
this as an opportunity to examine de novo a number of fundamental
87. See Steven Krane, Regulating Attorney Conduct: Past, Present,and Future,29 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 247, 257-58 (2000) (noting the stated goals of Ethics 2000, but also lamenting that it was a
narrow approach of the Commission to simply refresh, but not comprehensively reexamine, the
Model Rules).
88. See American Bar Association Adopted by the House of Delegates, ABA, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/j oumal/1I19c.authcheckdam
.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (reporting on the formation of a task force addressing corporate
responsibility); Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice: About the Commission, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/committees-commissions/commissi
ononmultijurisditionalpractice.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (introducing the Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice).
89. See STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at-25-26.
90. See id. at 25-32, 60; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (2002); see STANDARDS, RULES &
STATUTES, supranote 33, at 298.
92. See STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at 40-42.

93.
94.
95.
96.

See id.at 92.
See, e.g., id. at 32, 38.
See, e.g., id. at 9-12.
See Status of State Review of ProfessionalConduct Rules, supra note 10.
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issues in the regulation of lawyers within their borders; this, of course,
was discouraged by the ABA. 97

One unusual aspect about Ethics 2000 was that the passage of
wholesale modifications excluded major changes to the confidentiality
and entity rules that had been prompted by the corporate scandals and
the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.98 Instead, in 2003, one
year after the 2002 passage of the Ethics 2000 revisions, the ABA made
major changes to the confidentiality rules and the entity as client rules. 99
Did the leadership of the ABA fear that changes in confidentiality might
doom the entire redraft and they, therefore, decided to present those
changes separately? Did they seek to avoid a controversial debate on
the floor of the ABA House of Delegates? The two
modifications to the Ethics 2000 version of the Model Rules established
a precedent that revisions would be expected to take
place periodically.
Between 2003 and 2009, the ABA amended the Model Rules three
times with mixed success. 10 0 In 2007, a comment to Rule 5.5 was
amended to reflect the ABA's efforts to accommodate temporary legal
practice in a jurisdiction that suffers a disaster.101 In 2008, the ABA
added Rule 3.8(g) and 3.8(h) to address the duties of prosecutors who
learn information about a wrongful conviction in light of the hundreds of
DNA exonerations that have arisen in recent times.10 2 However, only a
small minority of states has adopted the new provisions, and many
prosecutors have expressed concern about the wisdom of imposing the
burdens of these new rules on their offices. 10 3 In February 2009, the
ABA amended Rule 1.10 to address the important issue of migratory
lawyers and firm disqualification. 104 New language was adopted to allow
97. See id. The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility has a Policy Implementation
Committee that is responsible for helping to obtain state adoption of the model documents approved
by the ABA House of Delegates.
98. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
99. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13 (2002), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13 (2003).
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(2008); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007).
101. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2007); see ABA, MODEL COURT RULE ON
PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES FOLLOWING DETERMINATION OF MAJOR DISASTER (2007),

reprinted in ABA, COMPENDIUM OF CLIENT PROTECTION RULES (2007) (following the experiences
of Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina).
102. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)-(h); see Wayne D. Garris, Jr., Note, Model
Rule of ProfessionalConduct 3.8: The ABA Takes a Stand Against Wrongful Convictions, 22 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 829, 830-31, 836-37 (2009).
103. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorsand ProfessionalRegulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873, 889-93 (2012) (examining the debate over state enactment of Rule 3.8(g) and 3.8(h)).
104.

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2008), with MODEL RULES OF
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a firm to use screening when hiring a lateral lawyer to avoid
disqualification. 10 5 However, criticism that the adopted language did not
limit screening to migratory lawyers caused the ABA to amend its
language in August 2009.106 Two of these experiences illustrate failures
in the ABA drafting process: one being a failure of precise drafting and
the other being a failure of effective consultation with the prosecutors
who ultimately would be regulated by the Rule.
In 2009, ABA President Carolyn Lamm formed the Ethics 20/20
Commission ("Ethics 20/20") in order to study the many changes in the
legal profession in the United States and around the world, and to
propose changes to the Model Rules. 10 7 The topics of focus would
include the impact of technology upon the practice of law as well as the
many fundamental differences in modem law practice. 0 8 Ethics 20/20
formed many subcommittees, and these groups produced working papers
on many different topics.'0 9
In 2012, Ethics 20/20 issued concrete proposals to amend the
Model Rules in a piecemeal fashion over a period of several ABA
meetings."10 Ultimately, Ethics 20/20 decided that, despite all of the
changes in the legal profession, the Ethics 2000 version of the Model
Rules remained "relevant and valid," thus Ethics 20/20 would only
propose "clarifications and expansions" of the existing Rules."' To be
more precise, the Ethics 20/20 amendments represent the least
substantial revision of the four major revisions of the ethics Codes,
despite the dramatic changes in the legal profession that have occurred
in the past decade in the United States and around the world.

PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.10 (2009).
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.10 (2009).
106. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2009), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.10 (2010).

107. News Release, ABA, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission to
Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009), available
at
http://www.apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media/release/news-release.c fm?releaseid=730
(announcing the creation of the Ethics 20/20 Commission).
108. See id.
109. Work Product,ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
aba commission on ethics_20_20/workproduct.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
110. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/aba commission on ethics_20_20.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013)
(explaining the process for adoption of proposals of Ethics 20/20). This approach is curious given
that it does not give the states a new entire set of changes to consider at one time.
11. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1, 7 (2013) [hereinafter
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW], availableat http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ethics20_20_final hod introdution and overview report.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
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Most observers viewed Ethics 20/20 as a major opportunity to
examine and consider changes that recently have taken place in the legal
professions of the United States and other countries. The resulting work
product, however, has disappointed many scholars and lawyers because
the results do not match the promises.' 1 2 Many difficult issues were
considered simply too political to tackle." 3 Other issues were forced into
the Comments of existing Rules, thereby downplaying the need to make
amendments to the Rules themselves." 4 Many view the transformation
of Ethics 20i20, from a major overhaul of the Model Rules to a meager
set of proposed changes, to be a stark illustration of politics within the
ABA operating to prevent the organization from making fundamental
and necessary changes to the Model Rules." 5
Until now, the ABA has been at the forefront of promulgating
ethics codes that address many issues that lawyers confront. Although
some may disagree with the language and judgments, the ABA has
undertaken fundamental reform of the legal ethics codes on three
occasions. 1 6 Ethics 20/20 is a failure of the ABA to confront issues that
law firms and lawyers are now facing on a daily basis. 1 7 Ethics 20/20's
decision to avoid these issues does not mean that they will disappear. It
means that the ABA has failed to fulfill its responsibility of reforming
the Model Rules to provide the guidance needed regarding the modem
issues in the practice of law.
III.

LAW FIRM AND LAWYER DECISIONMAKING
IN PROBLEMS OF ETHICS

Lawyering as a profession is difficult to regulate, possibly more so
than other professions, because a fundamental role of a lawyer is to
serve as an agent representing the interests of a client-principal with the

112. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas D. Morgan to ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, supra
note 11 (expressing disappointment in the failure of Ethics 20/20 to recognize the
institutionalization of law practice).
113. See, e.g., News Release, ABA, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose
Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr. 16, 2012), available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120416_news_
release renonlawyerownership law firms.authcheckdam.pdf.
114. See generally INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note 111 (providing examples of
Comments added to existing Rules).
115. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 11 (discussing an interview with Anthony E. Davis, Esq.
about the scope of Ethics 20/20's recommendations relating to choice of law).
116. These three major ABA reforms were the adoption of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1969, the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, and the
adoption in 2002 of the major amendments proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission.
117. See Rogers, supranote 11.
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duty of zeal.' 18 Stated differently, the very nature of lawyering involves
advocating for a client's interest and interpreting law and policy in such
a way that benefits the representation. Despite the efforts of the
profession to limit the effect of economic pressures, few will deny that
the economics of law practice significantly influence lawyer behavior.
And, the increase of economic pressures has accentuated pressures upon
law firms and their members. All of this is, of course, complicated by the
fact that few lawyers ever face the consequences of rule violations. And,
many lawyers pay lip service to legal ethics rather than embrace the
system of regulation in a meaningful way. This Part will examine the
difficulties inherent in lawyering that affect the ability of the Model
Rules to regulate lawyer conduct.
A.

Representationof Client Interests with Zeal

The duty of zealous representation has always been a source of
concern for those who wish to enforce rules of professional conduct in a
consistent manner. The Model Code contained an express canon
imposing the duty of zeal, and the Model Rules put the concept of zeal
into the preamble.1 19 Some have argued that the Model Rules
significantly tempered the duty of zeal, and, thus, that the problem is less
pronounced today. 20 Nevertheless, in several fundamental areas, the
duty of zeal continues to lead to under-enforcement of ethics rules and to
disparate behavior by lawyers.
The duty of zeal problem is most evident in the litigation context.
Lawyers rely upon the duty of zeal in asserting that it is their obligation
to play as close to the line as possible in litigation so as to provide their
clients with effective representation. They use the duty of zeal to justify
strained interpretations of what is a proper answer to discovery or what
constitutes appropriate preparation of witnesses who are called to
testify. 2 1 Lawyers use the duty of zeal to justify nondisclosure in the
candor to the court context. 122 Some believe that settlement can avoid
118. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1707, 1712-14 (1998). This is in no way intended to denigrate the difficulty of regulating
professionals in general. Each profession has its own set of challenges and the regulation of
professional services often can be difficult. Lawyering is so related to facts and context that best
practices may be difficult to spell out in detail, at least in certain areas of law practice.
119.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L

RESPONSIB1LITY Canon 7 (1980).
120. See Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A Historical
Perspective,63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381,432 (2012).
121. See Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1618, 1620 (1996).
122. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. Prrr. L.
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disclosure to the court when an issue of candor to the court arises. 1
They use the duty of zeal to justify the overly aggressive examination of
witnesses in depositions and in trial. 124 Some lawyers argue that every
litigant deserves a day in court even if the merits of the case border on
the frivolous. 125 Codes of civility that were largely viewed as a solution
to the failures of126
the ABA Model Codes have similarly had difficulty in
controlling zeal.
In the litigation area, Model Rule 3.3 imposes an obligation of
candor to the court upon lawyers that requires disclosure when a client
commits perjury or a fraud on the court. Criminal lawyers abide by this
127
obligation that was affirmed under the guidance of Nix v. Whiteside,
but lawyers in civil litigation often try to avoid such obligations when
clients engage in similar conduct. 128 Also, lawyers, under the guise of
the duty of zeal, impose significant costs upon opposing parties in order
to gain an advantage in litigation. Some judges and magistrates do not
tolerate such behavior and have managed to control this with various
measures, but the ABA's failure to adequately address this problem in
ethics Codes has made the litigation-related provisions of these codes
less effective in regulating lawyer behavior. Moreover, alternative
efforts to control overly zealous
behavior in lawyering through codes of
29
professionalism have failed.1
In litigation and non-litigation, the duty of zeal plays a role in
justifying adversarial tactics in phases such as negotiation and
mediation. 130 The Comments to the Model Rules contemplate half-truths

REv. 693, 724 (2006) (discussing the requirement of disclosure even when it is harmful to a client's
case and the failure of the Model Rules to temper overly zealous advocacy).
123. See Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelinesfor Settlement Negotiations:
Exceeding the Limits of the AdversarialEthic, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1218, 1237-38 (2004).
124. See Patrick T. O'Rourke, Enforcing Civility: The Rules of Professional Conduct in
Deposition Settings, COLO. LAW., Mar. 2004, at 75, 76.
125. See Samuel D. Zurier, Order in the Court: Deterring Frivolous Lawsuits in Rhode
Island'sFederalDistrictCourt, R.I. B.J., Apr. 1997, at 7, 7.
126. See Gaetke, supra note 122, at 724-25.
127. 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986); see Raymond J. McKoski, Prospective Perjury by a Criminal
Defendant: It's AllAbout the Lawyer, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1575, 1601-02 (2012) (discussing the effects
of Nix v. Whiteside on representing a criminal defense client who wants to give perjured testimony).
Nix held that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for a lawyer to tell the criminal defense
client about the lawyer's duty to inform the court if the client commits perjury in testifying during
the trial. Nix, 475 U.S. at 190-91.
128. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 3.3-5(g) (2013).

129. See Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility
Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 769-70 (2000) (discussing attorneys using the duty of
zealous advocacy as a defense to violations of codes of professionalism).
130. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123, 123-24 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
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on matters of value and opinion. 13 1 And, the ABA issued a Formal
Opinion that permits lawyers to misrepresent settlement values to the
opposing side in negotiation. 132 Adversarial tactics in negotiation are
well known and even taught as part of negotiation training, and the ABA
has done little to discourage such behavior. 33 Similarly, in mediation,
zealous representation tactics to gain advantages
lawyers have adopted
34
clients.1
their
for
The duty of zeal also plays a significant role in lawyer
interpretation of confidentiality and disclosure obligations. Lawyers
justify nondisclosure as necessary to protect the client. 35 And, often
such interpretations have led to pushback in cases such as Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,136 establishing a duty to disclose
a client confidence to prevent the death or substantial bodily harm of a
third person, and have also appeared when lawyers represent clients in
regulated industries. 3 7 In the area of tax returns and tax opinions, the
U.S. Treasury Department has had to develop its own rules on lawyer
and accountant conduct. 3 8 Issues have also arisen in the lawyer's role as
an evaluator when the client asks the lawyer to prepare an opinion for
use by a third person. 139 Again, these efforts, in part, are an attempt to
limit lawyers' use of zeal in the representation of clients.
Essentially, I argue that the ABA and state ethics authorities have
failed to properly deal with the harms resulting from misuse and

2000).
131.
132.
133.
lawyers

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2012).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 439 (2006).
Most of the casebooks on this subject discuss adversarial tactics, and often conclude that
use such behavior to gain advances in negotiation. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL.,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 67-71,
74-77 (6th ed. 2012).
134.

See Bette J. Roth, Ethical Considerationsfor Advocates in Mediation, BETTE J. ROTH,

ESQ. 2-5, http://www.rothadr.com/pages/publications/ethics%20reprint.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2013).
135. The argument has been advanced that, once a lawyer may disclose, the range of cases
requiring disclosure will increase over time. See, e.g., Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor'sDuty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1222 (2000).
136. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort
Liability When a Lawyer Fails to Warn a Third Party of a Client's Threat to Cause Serious Bodily
Harm, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 479, 518-19 (2000).
137. See generally William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor
and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998)

(examining the lawyer's duty of candor in the Kaye Scholer matter).
138. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.34-35 (2012); see also The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax
Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1553, 1582-83, 1586-87 (George
Cooper ed., 1980).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2012); Charles E. McCallum & Bruce C,
Young, Ethics Issues in Opinion Practice, 62 BUS. LAW. 417, 418-21 (2007).
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misinterpretation of the duty of zeal and this failure has undercut the
implementation of many aspects of regulating lawyers' behavior. The
ABA should examine the Rules that are affected by zeal and make clear
how they should be interpreted by lawyers so that uniformity may result.
Of course, in criminal cases, the duty of zeal has an especially important
place and the Rules are quite explicit on how that should work in terms
of requiring the government to prove every element of the case against
the defendant. 40 Yet, the Rules also are quite clear on the limits of zeal
when candor to the court is involved in criminal cases. This same level
of detailed guidance should be added to the Rules regarding the
appropriate balance between zealous representation of a client and the
duty of candor in the civil litigation context.
Our legal system has evolved from a primarily adversarial system
to a hybrid system without an equivalent evolution in the ethics rules
governing lawyer behavior. 141 The lawyer still has a duty to zealously
advocate for the client's interest and position, but the duty of zeal should
not be allowed to be a justification for lawyer behavior that imposes
significant costs on the legal system and society in general. It is time that
the ABA more fully recognize the hybrid nature
of the system and
142
implement appropriate limitations in the Rules.
B.

The Nature ofLawyering

Beginning in law school and carrying forward to legal practice,
lawyers learn how to argue all sides of a case. In criminal cases, defense
attorneys argue cases to ensure that criminal defendant clients have their
day in court and that the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases, lawyers craft arguments in
favor of their clients and they often lose perspective on the relative value
of the positions. Sometimes this is referred to as the notion that a lawyer
is taught to make any argument with a straight face so as to properly
140.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012).

141. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 45,49-50 (1996).
142. One prominent example arose in the context of collaborative lawyering in family law
cases. A Colorado opinion raised questions about whether lawyers could properly participate in
representing clients in collaborative lawyering. See Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115
(2007). An ABA opinion had to be issued to clarify the issue of whether collaborative lawyering
conflicted with the duty of zeal. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op.
447 (2007); see generally Ted Schneyer, The OrganizedBar and the Collaborative Law Movement:
A Study in ProfessionalChange, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289 (2008) (discussing the lawyering and ethics
issues raised by collaborative law). For a detailed examination of how the ABA House of Delegates
rejected the adoption of a model collaborative law statute, see Gillers, How to Make Rules for
Lawyers, supra note 19, at 388-96.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 15

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:55

represent their client. 143 Adversarial justice, which lies at the heart of the
nature of lawyering, as well as legal reasoning of authorities from both
sides, leads to similar deliberations when interpreting codes of ethics. 144
One aspect of adversarial justice derives from the hired gun model
of lawyering where a client hires a lawyer to advocate the client's best
arguments without the lawyer accepting any moral consequences for
taking the positions. 145 The moral detachment of lawyers from client
interests is appealing on many levels, but, in a sense, it does end up
creating circumstances in which lawyers can say, "I do not morally
support this146
position, but I am obligated to make it with zeal on behalf of
client."'
my
Thus, in any of the areas where the Rules require interpretation,
lawyers often use legal reasoning to arrive at a result that most benefits
their interests or their client's interests. In conflicts, lawyers examine the
materiality of the conflict and often downplay its significance. 147 In
examining whether the lawyer can provide competent and diligent
representation, lawyers often come to the conclusion that they can
continue in the representation, notwithstanding even glaring potential
conflicts of interest. 148 In determining whether a matter is substantially
related, lawyers often take aggressive positions that two matters are not
substantially related. 49 When lawyers seek to obtain advance consent
from clients, they choose to draft the language describing the conflict
more broadly because specific and detailed information about the0
conflict would discourage the client from signing the advance consent.15
Adversarial justice has an appropriate and important place, but, when
143.
(2005).
144.

See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 301-02
See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'

ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 89 (David Luban ed., 1983).

145. See Camille A. Gear, Note, The Ideology of Domination:Barriers to Client Autonomy in
Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107 YALE L.J. 2473, 2493 (1998) (explaining the hired gun model of
lawyering).
146. See Luban, supra note 144, at 89.
147. See Dan Bressler, Conflicts of Interest + Interesting Conflicts, L. FIRM RISK
MANAGEMENT BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://www.lawfirmrisk.com/2012/12/conflicts-ofinterest-interesting.html. So lawyers often will take on the representation of the client without
obtaining consent to the possible conflict on the grounds that the representation is not "materially
limited" by the conflict within the meaning of Rule 1.7(a) when the safer and wiser move would be
to seek the client's informed consent to the possible conflict.
148. See Kurt Eichenwald, Another Inquiry: Company Hobble Investigation by Its Law Firm,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A19 (describing Vinson & Elkins LLP's reasons for
accepting as an engagement the internal investigation prompted at Enron by Sharren Watkins).
149. See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 607-11 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing the
arguments set forth to disqualify counsel).
150. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1 (2006)
(discussing the consequences of different ways of drafting advance waivers for clients).
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lawyers adopt extreme positions to
interpret ethics rules, the rules are not
51
followed in a consistent manner.1
What is the alternative to having lawyers use their adversarial skills
to interpret the rules? More carefully crafted rules could avoid some of
these interpretive issues. Lawyers could develop principles of best
practices that would temper some of the more extreme positions. They
could implement loss prevention and risk management programs to limit
their exposure to liability. And, law firms could use in-house ethics
counsel to implement a uniform interpretation of ethics rules for all
lawyers in the firm.15 2 Accountability through more effective
enforcement could similarly force lawyers to apply the rules without
using the arguments that they employ on behalf of their clients. The cost
of disparate interpretations of identical ethics provisions is significant
and should be addressed explicitly.
C. The Economic Pressures
The economic pressures on law practice have always been present;
however, effective competition was less evident in the early years of law
practice. Some could attribute the lack of effective competition to the
efforts of the organized bar in limiting advertising, controlling entry, and
seeking to establish minimum prices. 153 Others could argue that
competition in the legal profession is always less intense when the
number of lawyers in a geographical area is small. 154 Of course, lawyers
in some markets were able to overcome those early efforts to deter
competition. And, the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. Arizona
State Bar,'55 which opened the door to widespread attorney advertising,
accelerated the entry into the market of small law firms providing
routine legal services. Today, advances in technology have played an
important role in increasing access to legal services across state lines,
providing potential
clients with access to lawyers, and reducing the cost
56
of legal services. 1

151. I acknowledge that some law firms and lawyers are more risk averse and embrace a
professional culture of careful interpretation and application of ethical standards.
152. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the Same: Creating
StructuralIncentives in Large Law Firms to PromoteEthical Behavior-In-HouseEthics Counsel,
Bill Padding,and In -House Ethics Training,44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 702-11 (2011).
153. ABEL,supra note 20, at 111.
154. Seeidat40-41.
155. 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (protecting truthful advertising under the First Amendment).
156. The impact of advances and changes in technology upon the delivery of legal services has
been substantial. From the concept of digitized documents, to the Internet, to cloud computing,
electronic discovery, and electronic filing, law practice has been significantly streamlined by
technology. See generally James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice,
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In 1986, the ABA acknowledged the pressures that competition was
placing upon its efforts to regulate law practice. 157 It called for drastic
measures to address these issues. 158 However, few would predict that,
less than twenty years later, technology and developments in the global
legal profession would have a profound impact upon the way in which
lawyers practice law and are regulated by bar authorities.
Professor Thomas D. Morgan, in his book, The Vanishing
American Lawyer, provides a detailed examination of the competition
that lawyers face today and the inability of law schools, state bars, and
lawyers to adjust to the new competitive order.15 9 Professor Morgan
analyzes in detail the many stresses upon lawyers including, among
others, technology, growth of in-house counsel, global competition, the
increase in the number of lawyers, and the shift of the profession away
from representing individual clients to representing entity clients. 160 The
depth and breadth of the changes that have occurred in the legal
profession have altered the nature of practice for virtually all lawyers in
61
this country in a twenty-five year time span.
Law firms and lawyers are addressing "trends like increased pricing
competition, more commoditization of legal work, more non-hourly
billing, fewer equity partners, more contract lawyers, reduced leverage,
162
and smaller first year classes as permanent trends going forward."'
These trends, along with increasing use of laterals, are influencing the
way in which firms train and monitor lawyers. 163 They are also putting
even more of a premium on client acquisition and retention. 164 As firms
and lawyers face the major restructuring of their practices, the way in
which they interact with the professional codes is evolving. And, the
drafters of the ethics codes must consider such factors in order to
continue to effectively regulate the practice of law.

26 HARV.J.L. & TECi. 241, 247-56 (2012) (describing specific advances in technology).
157. See ABA, Comm'n on Professionalism, ".... In the Spirit of Public Service:" A
Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 306 (1986).

158. See id.
at 263-64.
159. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 207-13 (2010)
(discussing ways to think about legal education in the twenty-first century).
160. Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV.
625, 631-35 (1994).
161. MORGAN, supranote 159, at 78-80.
162.

GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, REPORT ON THE

STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 14 (2013).

163. See id.at 11 (discussing lateral movements and firm management of partner
expectations).
164. See id at 14 (discussing how firms must adapt to market realities to effectively respond to
client demands).
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Sophisticated clients are demanding that lawyers and the legal
profession accommodate their needs by creating special rules or
exceptions. 165 In the public comment process of the Ethics 20/20 debate,
general counsels prepared a submission arguing that the current Rules
did not properly address the needs of their clients. 166 The corporate
clients asked the ABA to consider a contractarian perspective on
conflicts rules so that their lawyers can make reasonable exceptions to
imputation and automatic application of the Rules. 167 For the most part,
such contractarian-based
Ethics 20/20 chose not to 16incorporate
8
exceptions to the conflicts rules.
The increased profit motive focus of modem law firms and the
resulting efforts to maximize revenues and minimize costs 169 has led to
many decisions that are purely made on the economics of the choices. 170
For example, some have argued that several of the more prominent
conflicts and disclosure cases involved law firms that had a significant
percentage of their business with the client in question. 17' The pressures
of competition also have reduced the supervision and training of
associates even though partners may be responsible for the mistakes of
such lawyers within the firm.' 72 One can surmise that lawyers today
165. See generally ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM GENERAL
COUNSEL FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW FIRMS AND SOPHISTICATED
CLIENTS (2011) [hereinafter PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics20 20 comments/
lawfirmgeneralcounsel-issuespaperconcerningmultijurisdictionalpractice.authcheckdam.pdf.
166. See id. (noting that the rules of legal practice do not address the needs of sophisticated
clients).
167. See James W. Jones & Anthony E. Davis, In Defense of a Reasoned DialogueAbout Law
Firms and Their Sophisticated Clients, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 589, 592-97 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/2012/03/27/jones&davis.html; see also PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM
GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 165. For an opposing view, see generally Lawrence Fox, The Gang
of Thirty-Three: Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client Loyalty, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 567 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/2012/03/27/fox.html (criticizing the suggestion that conflict rules
should be altered in regards to sophisticated clients).
168. See Rogers, supra note 11 (discussing the scope of Ethics 20/20's proposals concerning
conflicts checking). Ethics 20/20 did, in its modifications to the Comments to Model Rule 8.5,
contemplate client and lawyer agreement to choose the ethics rules that would apply in a crossborder representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (2002). This client
agreement feature, however, is far short of what many have demanded because it appears in the
Comments and not in the text of Rule 8.5, it is only a short reference without detail, and it applies
only for the purpose of choosing a jurisdiction under the Rule 8.5 analysis.
169. See Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV. 515, 51920,522 (1996) (discussing law firm concerns with economic prospects).
170. Seeid. at 518-19.
171. See Edward A. Bernstein, Structural Conflicts of Interest: How a Law Firm's
CompensationSystem Affects Its Ability to Serve Clients, 2003 ILL. L. REv. 1261, 1263-66.
172. See Robert V. Hillman, Professional Partnerships,Competition, and the Evolution of
Firm Culture, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061, 1076-79 (2001) (discussing how law firms have changed their
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view ethics rules in a very different light when the rules reduce lawyers'
ability to represent clients and thereby reduce their law business profits.
Thus, the economic realities of the modem legal profession need to be
taken into account by the ABA and state bar authorities in formulating
sensible reforms of ethics rules.
D. The Lack ofAccountability
One serious problem with the current system of regulation is the
fact that few lawyers face scrutiny for violating many of the rules
governing legal practice. Few lawyers and judges report other lawyers
for violating the rules. Many of the rules do not lend themselves to
enforcement, and state bar disciplinary systems are directed at enforcing
violations of a few specific rules. The consequences of violating many
rules of professional conduct are simply too remote, and even if
implemented, too lenient to have any serious deterrent effect such that
lawyers do not properly monitor compliance.
Lawyers and judges have long resisted the duty to report other
lawyers to disciplinary authorities. Rule 8.3 is clear, but as a practical
matter, few lawyers comply with the requirement.1 73 Every so often, a
court imposes a penalty against a lawyer for failure to report another
lawyer, but the cases involve extreme fact situations in which few would
disagree that the reporting obligation would have prevented future
harms. 174 When the lawyer commits a wrong against a corporate client
and the matter is confidential, many corporations choose not to report
because the disclosure of the incident would harm investor opinion of
corporate management and the corporation's internal controls. 75 Thus,
the "honor code" of Rule 8.3 that was designed to bring more cases to
disciplinary authorities is only invoked in rare circumstances. 176

training policies due to economic pressures).
173. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2012); Vincent R. Johnson, Legal
Malpractice and the Duty to Report Misconduct, I ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 40,46-47

& n.19 (2011).
174. See, e.g., In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1241-42 (La. 2005) (involving a lawyer who
did not report to the state bar authorities a prosecutor friend who confessed privately that he had
fabricated blood evidence in a case that led to a capital sentence); In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790,
791-92 (II1. 1988) (involving a lawyer, James J. Himmel, who agreed not to report another lawyer to
the state bar authorities if that lawyer agreed to repay money he had misappropriated).
175. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., T1E LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.8-.9 (3d ed. 2012
& Supp. 2013).
176. See generally Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Note, A CurrentLook at Model Rule
8.3: How Is It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747 (2003)

(discussing the difficulties faced by lawyers in deciding when and how to comply with Rule 8.3).
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The ABA has collected information about the types of cases that
177
appear before disciplinary committees and the resulting discipline.
Disciplinary action overwhelmingly impacts small practitioners in the
criminal and family law areas. 178 Most lawyers simply do not view
179
violations of the rules as leading to any significant risk of discipline.
The failure of the regulatory system to impose accountability upon
lawyers who violate the rules affects the profession's attitude towards
such rules.
The ABA has sought to expand compliance with the Model Rules.
In 1983, the ABA added Rules that impose disciplinary responsibility
upon partners and supervisory lawyers. 180 These Rules stopped short of
implementing a vicarious disciplinary responsibility, but did impose a
duty to deal with ethics problems that are discovered at a time when the
misconduct could be avoided or mitigated. 181 These provisions took one
important step in implementing accountability in the enforcement of
ethics rules; however, few disciplinary committees have used these
Rules to actually discipline lawyers. 82 Two states have expanded this
concept to include firm responsibility, 8 3 but similarly, those
holding many law firms accountable
jurisdictions do not end up actually
84
1
misconduct.
lawyers'
for their
The lack of accountability for lawyers who violate ethics rules has
had an effect upon the extent to which lawyers follow these rules. Some
might argue that little can be done about this problem, but one solution is
reform of the lawyer disciplinary process. Many scholars have argued
for peer review of law firms or performance ratings. 185 Of course,
the ABA could finally explicitly acknowledge that disciplinary
systems cannot be the only source of accountability for violations

177. See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners,41 HOUS. L.
REv. 309, 312-13 & n.14 (2004).
178. See id.
179. Ott & Newton, supranote 176, at 754.
180.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1-.3 (1983).

181. Seeid
182. See id; Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4,
8-10 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline] (identifying the trend of large law firms
and individuals in large firms not being held accountable by disciplinary proceedings).
183. See id. at 15 n.91.
184. See id. at 15-16, 19.
185. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner'sKeeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66
COLO. L. REv. 329, 363-70 (1995) (suggesting a system for peer review); Susan Saab Fortney, Are
Law Firm PartnersIslands unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and
Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 306-08 (1995) (discussing accountability within law firms).
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of the Rules, and encourage
courts to enforce these rules in
186
appropriate circumstances.
E. The ABA 's Fearthat the Rules Will Be Used Outside of
the DisciplinaryProcess
The ABA initially maintained that its Rules should be used only in
disciplinary cases and not in any other context. 187 In part, this argument
was based upon a view that the language used by the ABA was designed
for the disciplinary context and not for other purposes. 188 Of course,
other sources of regulation, such as the judiciary in malpractice cases,
were free to create their own standards of conduct for lawyers. But the
very nature of professional malpractice and negligence liability cases
involves upon an inquiry into whether the professional acted reasonably
under the circumstances. The inquiry of reasonableness, in turn,
necessarily involves a consideration of norms of practice that
professionals must follow.
Not surprisingly, when an organization such as the ABA establishes
a set of norms for lawyer professionals, those standards after years of
use become part of the definition of a reasonable lawyer under the
circumstances. Courts in many circumstances began to allow litigants to
admit the Rules as evidence of a standard of conduct.' 8 9 Commonly,
experts use the Rules in opining on standards of care. Similarly, courts,
as regulatory bodies over litigation, began to refer to the ethics codes to
set standards for conduct in court. 190 Rules, such as the provision dealing
with communication with persons represented by counsel and the
provision governing candor to the court, were relevant to the standards
that judges began to apply.' 9' The most significant development
occurred when the Model Code was used by courts to establish conflicts
of interest rules. 192 This development essentially made the Model Code

186. See Wilkins, supra note 25, at 802-03 (presenting the view that the ABA believes that
disciplinary agencies should maintain primary responsibility for monitoring lawyers and their
professional obligations).
187. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope (2012) ("[The rules] are not designed to be
a basis for civil liability.").
188. See id.
189. See Charles L. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in CivilLitigation,30 S.C. L. REV. 281, 285-86 (1979).
190. See id. at 289-90. Many federal courts adopted the Model Rules as their rules of conduct
in litigation.
191. See id at 309-10 (discussing the prohibition against direct or indirect communication with
a party represented by counsel).
192. See Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm
Disqualificationin the Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 831, 852-53 (1995).
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extremely relevant in an important area of conflicts that had a concrete
impact on whether lawyers could represent clients in litigation.
The ABA today is often influenced by collateral uses of its Codes
in drafting the Model Rules, and often such influences lead to less than
optimal results. For example, in Rule 1.5 on fees, the ABA refused to
require that all fee agreements be in writing because of the fear that
lawyers who did not have a written fee agreement would be unable to
collect their fee. 193 Thus, the Rule was drafted to say "preferably in
writing," rather than making it an absolute requirement. 194 Another
example is the original Rule 2.2 on intermediation.1 95 That Rule had
many bright-line tests before a lawyer could accept an intermediation
and continue the representation of the multiple clients. 196 One of those
bright-line tests required a lawyer to withdraw once the lawyer could no
longer meet the underlying requirements. 197 That mandatory withdrawal,
along with the other bright-line tests, caused Rule 2.2 to be a frequent
source of malpractice litigation. 198 Ethics 2000 deleted Rule 2.2 and
placed many of the concepts underlying that Rule in the comments for
the current client conflicts Rules.' 99
The expanded use of the ethics Codes in other contexts has had an
effect on the ABA. In a sense, it is sensitive to the ways in which these
Rules are used outside of the disciplinary context when it creates new
ethics Rules. Thus, in addressing a cutting edge issue such as alternative
litigation funding, for example, one might fear the implications that
limiting standards would create, therefore causing hesitation in
addressing problems that otherwise might be examined. This fear of

193. Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers, supra note 19, at 403-04. Professor Gillers notes
two additional reasons why the ABA may not wish to impose a writing requirement upon fee
agreements. See id First, lack of clarity benefits lawyers because they can prevail in disputes with
less sophisticated clients. Id. at 405. Second, it is too difficult for lawyers to determine the fee at the
outset when the scope of the representation remains unclear. See id. at 403-04.
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2012); Gillers, How to Make Rules for
Lawyers, supra note 19, at 403-04.
195. Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 665, 679-80 (2001)
(discussing Rule 2.2).
196. See id.
197. See id.
Explanation of Changes, ABA,
Reporter's
2.2:
Rule
Model
198. See
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/policy/ethics-2000-commission/e2
k_rule22rem.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (discussing the potential risks of Rule 2.2
outweighing the potential benefits).
199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (2012); David W. Raack, The Ethics
2000 Commission's Proposed Revision of the Model Rules. Substantive Change or Just a
Makeover?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 233, 250 (2001); Model Rule 2.2: Reporter's Explanation of
Changes, supra note 198.
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addressing important issues because of the potential collateral effects has
proven to be a major obstacle to fundamental reform of the Model Rules.
F.

The Lack of Respect Towards Efforts to
Regulate the PracticeofLaw

One serious problem in implementing ethics rules is the fact that
many lawyers simply do not respect the current system for regulating
lawyers. Society in general finds the notion of lawyers' ethics to be a
less than serious subject. But lawyers in particular have only been
influenced by the areas where the ethics rules directly impacted their law
practice. Before the courts imposed disqualification as a sanction for
violation of conflicts of interest rules, legal ethics was viewed as a
theoretical subject best left to academics. 200 After the introduction of
disqualification as a trial tactic, law firms began to manage conflicts
much more precisely to ensure that they could continue to represent their
clients. 20 1 But lawyers often view the rules of professional responsibility
as nuisances, rather than as an effort by the bar authorities to
meaningfully regulate a profession.20 2
The ABA, the state bars, and law schools have sought to raise the
level of respect for legal ethics and the professionalism of lawyers.2 3
This effort began with the mandated instruction in legal ethics in all
ABA accredited law schools and the introduction of professionalism
programs.204 Despite these requirements, some schools continue to treat
ethics and professionalism as less than serious subjects, and thereby
foster this lack of respect.20 5
200. See Wilkins, supra note 25, at 828 & n.l 15. The disqualification of law firms on the
grounds of a conflict of interest forced firms to implement structures to ensure that conflicts were
properly discovered and managed. See id. at 828.
201. Seeid. at828&n.114.
202.

See Edward D. Re, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Legal Profession, 68

ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 85, 115-16 (1994).
203. See id. at 124-26.
204.

See Kathleen Clark, Legacy of Watergatefor Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J.

673, 673-75 (2000) (noting that the requirement of instruction in professional responsibility arose
after the involvement of lawyers in the Watergate scandal).
205. Some schools satisfy the ethics requirement through mini-courses offered between
semesters. E.g., Law-Related Courses Offered in Winter of 2010, WASH. & LEE U.,
http://www.wlu.edu/x36336.xml (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). Others offer this through a series of
lectures where students simply indicate attendance. E.g., Ethicsfor the Wisconsin Lawyer - 2012,
U. WISC. L. SCH., http://www.law.wisc.edu/clew/ethics.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
Interestingly, New York and California now require that L.L.M. students who seek to take the bar
examination take a full course in professional responsibility. See, e.g., CaliforniaBar Examination
Requirementsfor LLM Students - 2012-2013, BERKLEY L., U. CAL., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/

files/California Bar Examination_Requirements for ProfessionalLLM_Students.pdf (last visited
Nov. 23,

2013); LLM Degree Requirements, N.Y. L. SCH.,
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In my opinion, a set of ethics rules that provides concrete guidance
and clearer requirements would, in fact, raise the level of respect paid to
the subject of legal ethics, similar to the way in which litigators respect
the rules of civil procedure and evidence. Moreover, lawyers must be
made aware of the policies that underlie specific ethics rules. This must
be part of a larger process of educating lawyers and the public about the
importance of ethical standards to maintaining and improving the quality
of legal representation. When lawyers do not take the ethics rules
seriously, the case for self-regulation is significantly undermined and it
becomes easier for nonlawyers to treat law as just another business,
which should be regulated by the normal governmental authorities
(rather than self-regulated).
IV.

IMPROVING THE DESIGN OF OUR ETHICS RULES

The design of an effective system for regulating lawyers must take
into account the justifications for and objectives of such regulation. The
ABA and the state bar authorities, however, have failed to articulate a
coherent and complete statement of objectives for regulating lawyers'
conduct. 0 6 An underlying assumption of this Article is that it is
desirable for society to regulate lawyers under a code of ethics that
guides lawyers to make consistent decisions when confronted with the
same ethical issues; thus, consistency is an important objective of ethics
rule design. In addition, there are a number of other objectives that need
to be taken into account in drafting appropriate ethics rules.20 7
First, many regulations are designed to protect the public as
potential consumers of legal services.20 8 There are some decisions that
lawyers make and actions they engage in that may injure clients, and this
regulation is designed to protect the broad category of the public when
they engage lawyers. 0 9 In part, some rules create duties to clients, while
others impose disclosure obligations to allow clients to make informed
graduate-and-certificate-programs/tax-l-m/l-l-m-degree-requirements (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
206. See Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80

FORDHAM L. REv. 2685, 2719 (2012) ("[W]e submit that the United States has not adopted
regulatory objectives for the legal profession.").

207. In a recent article on the topic of drafting ethics codes, Professor Gillers argues that the
drafters must consider three constituencies when presenting courts with an ethics code: (1) "clients
as a group"; (2) lawyers, because of their "agency status" in representing clients; and (3) "the justice
system itself." Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers, supra note 19, at 373-74. Professor Gillers

argues that when the interests of these constituencies clash, the justice system should prevail above
all, and client interests should prevail over the interests of lawyers. Id. at 374.
208. See id.
at 382 (discussing the ability of minimum fee schedules to help ensure competent
representation).
209. Id. at 374-75.
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decisions. 210 Lawyers work in a learned profession, and the profession
must maintain a high quality of legal services that are provided to
clients because the clients themselves may not understand what
constitutes quality.2 11
Second, some regulations protect third persons from injury caused
by a client represented by a lawyer.21 2 These rules address disclosure
obligations when the client is using the lawyer in a crime or fraud, or
when the lawyer knows that substantially certain death or bodily harm
may result.213 Other rules address fairness to third persons in negotiation,
or when lawyers deal with third parties on behalf of clients in litigation
or non-litigation situations.21 4
Third, some regulations protect the legal system from harm caused
by clients who are represented by a lawyer.2 15 In this context of
regulation, lawyers are governed by obligations to the tribunal or
legislature in situations in which clients may seek to use lawyers in
inappropriate ways that inflict harm on the institutions themselves or
third parties.2" 6 Ethics rules that do not protect the legal system would
threaten the existence of the very judicial and legislative institutions that
lawyers rely upon for the administration of justice.
Finally, some rules are designed to protect the legal profession and
its efforts to regulate lawyers. 217 One could begin with the lawyer's duty
to disclose another lawyer's misconduct.2 18 But it also includes broader
duties to core principles of lawyering such as loyalty, confidentiality,
and communication in light of a lawyer's fiduciary duties to the client.2 19
Rules that protect the profession also include obligations to provide
access to the legal system in light of the profession's insistence that only
lawyers offer legal services.220 In examining the Codes promulgated by
the ABA, one can usually find one or more of these justifications;

210. Seeid. at368-69.
211. Wright, supra note 36, at 9 (explaining the primary purpose as protecting clients).
212. See Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers, supra note 19, at 370 (discussing rules
concerning lawyer participation in a client fraud or crime).
213.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).

214. Id. R. 4.2-.4.
215. See, e.g.,id.R. 3.3.
216. See, e.g., id. (regarding candor to the court); id. R. 3.9 (regarding obligations to legislative
bodies or administrative agencies).
217. See id. R. 8.1-.5.
218. Id. R. 8.3.
219. Professor Carol Rice Andrews identifies the core duties of the legal profession that the
Codes have sought to protect: litigation fairness, competence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable
fees, and public service. See Andrews, supra note 32, at 1386.
220. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2012) (stating the responsibility to
provide legal services free of charge).
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however, such objectives are often not articulated and are usually
presumed to underlie our system of lawyer regulation.
The focus of this Article has been to examine the way in which the
ABA's Model Rules can be improved as a system of rules to regulate
lawyers' conduct. 221 There are several important changes that could
significantly improve rule design by the ABA.222
A. Rule Design in the ABA
Under the current structure, amendments or revisions to the Rules
can arise in two settings. When a president of the ABA has proposed a

major revision of the Rules, the ABA forms a commission or committee
to study and propose revisions to the Rules.223 Such groups usually
examine the entire body of rules in a systematic manner and then make a
coordinated proposal that could be presented to the ABA House of
Delegates at a single meeting or over the course of several meetings.2 24
Between the times when the Model Rules undergo major revisions, the
ABA has a process by which proposals can be made to the ABA House
of Delegates. 225 The standing committees of the ABA can propose

modifications to a provision of the Model Rules.226 These committees
often work with the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility
221. For an examination of rulemaking at the state level, see Lynn A. Baker, The Politics of
Legal Ethics: Case Study of a Rule Change, 53 AmIZ. L. REV. 425, 438-39 (2011) (examining the
rulemaking process in Texas regarding a change to the referral fee rule). Ultimately, state
rulemaking is as important as ABA rulemaking because the state bar processes and the state
supreme courts ultimately decide whether to adopt the ABA model provisions.
222. I acknowledge that the infrastructure needed to produce continuous and systematic
rulemaking will require significant resources and the ABA has been under financial stress in recent
times. However, regulation of the profession is one of the most important functions of the
organization. Thus, the leadership should properly fund the efforts to study the legal profession and
properly craft rules for inclusion in the Model Codes. The ABA could also partner with research
institutions such as universities and nonprofit organizations (such as the Association of Corporate
Counsel) in order to coordinate their efforts and save resources. Many academics and researchers
could obtain funding from their institutions for collaborative work with the ABA, and, although
ideally the ABA could do this on its own, it is clear that the ABA resources needed may not be
available.
223. See, e.g., ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, supranote 110 (discussing the reason for the
creation of the Commission on Ethics 20/20); see also Schneyer, Professionalism,supranote 47, at
688.
224. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Comm'n on Evaluation of Prof'l Standards,
chair's intro. (2012) (discussing the process by which proposed changes are presented to the ABA
House of Delegates).
225. See id.
226. Am. BAR ASS'N, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS: RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 2012-2013 § 31.7 (2012) [hereinafter ABA CONSTITUTION], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house-of delegates/aba-constitution_a
nd bylaws_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
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and the Center for Professional Responsibility to ensure that the proposal
has broad support within the ABA structure.227
228
The decisionmaking body of the ABA is the House of Delegates.
No new Rule or amendment to an existing Rule will be adopted unless it
can receive support of a majority of the members in the ABA House of
Delegates. 229 A majority of the 560 members of the ABA House of
Delegates is chosen by the states and state and local bar association
members. 30 In a sense, this ensures that changes have broad support
across the country and will more likely be adopted by the states.
However, the voting process often resembles what happens in the U.S.
House of Representatives. A majority of the ABA House of Delegates
appears to represent lawyers who practice in medium and small law
firms in law practices outside of the major metropolitan centers. 231 These
representatives tend to be resistant to change and they tend to not have
experience with some of the more aggressive abuses of the Rules. They
also are resistant to adopting Rules that may change longstanding
practices in their states.
One problem with the current structure is its failure to effect major
reform in light of important developments in the legal profession. The
ABA has had difficulty addressing issues such as: (1) ancillary business
practices, 232 (2) multidisciplinary services involving lawyers, 233 (3)
advertising in light of the Supreme Court decisions,2 34 (4) defining
unauthorized practice of law, 23 5 (5) outsourcing, 236 (6) pretexting and
227. See CPR Policy Implementation Committee, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/policy/aboutUs.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
228. See ABA CONSTITUTION, supra note 226, § 6.1.
229. Id § 30.1.
230. House of Delegates - General Information, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
leadership/delegates.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
231. See generally Alan E. DeWoskin, Five Decades of Service, GPSoLO, Mar.-Apr. 2012, at
10,
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo/2012/marchapril/five_
decades service.html (describing the growth of the General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Division
of the ABA).
232. See generally Schneyer, Policymaking,supra note 82 (discussing the ABA's difficulty in
addressing the issue of ancillary businesses).
233. See generally John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPracticeand the
American Legal Profession:A Market Approach to Regulatingthe Delivery of Legal Services in the
Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000) [hereinafter Dzienkowski & Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice] (discussing the ABA's difficulty in addressing the issue of
multidisciplinary practices like tax).
234. See generally Jan L. Jacobwitz & Gayland 0. Heathcoat II, Endless Pursuit: Capturing
Technology at the Intersection of the FirstAmendment and Attorney Advertising, 17 J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 63 (2012) (discussing the difficulty the ABA has had with regulating attorney advertising).
235. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPractice,supra note 233, at 107-08, 110.
236. See Eileen Libby, A Qualified Yes: U.S. Lawyers Must Manage Outsourcing
Arrangements to Avoid Ethics Concerns, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2008, at 32, 32.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss1/15

34

Dzienkowski: Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics

2013]

ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING

dissemblance, 237 and (7) alternative litigation finance. 23 8 Each of these
developments presents difficult issues of professional responsibility, and
the structure of the ABA rulemaking process makes it difficult to enact
meaningful reform. 239 One cannot be surprised that a senior lawyer in a
law firm or a senior administrator in a bar association has little incentive
to innovate. These lawyers already have their established practices and
workload. Change brings uncertainty. The competitive atmosphere in
the legal profession impedes change because small firms and those
in more rural communities are at risk of competition from larger
entities. So entrenchment and support for the status quo make sense
from the perspective of the members who hold positions in the ABA
House of Delegates.
It is important to note that, although support for the status quo may
be in the interest of a senior lawyer who may have less than a decade of
practice left, it may not make sense from the perspective of the law firms
as ongoing institutions or the more junior lawyers in those firms. The
short-term view causes the profession to lose control over the regulation
of new practices. The status quo may result in a situation in which the
profession cannot, at a later date, guide the practices that they refuse to
acknowledge at this time.
An example from the 1990s involves the regulation of lawyers'
involvement in providing ancillary business services to clients. In 1991,
the ABA House of Delegates enacted a new Model Rule 5.7 that sought

237. See generally Kathryn M. Fenton, Ethical Implications of Lawyer Pretexting, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrustlaw/at311550_fentonethical_
implications.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (discussing the ethical implications that
arise concerning pretexting).
238. See James Podgers, On the Lookout: Ethics 20/20 Commission Issues White PaperAbout
Alternative Litigation Financing,A.B.A. J., Dec. 2011, at 61, 61 (discussing the ABA's decision
that the growing use of alternative litigation financing did not require an adjustment to professional
conduct rules).
239. The ABA, through its Multijurisdictional Practice of Law Commission, did propose and
adopt in the ABA House of Delegates a new Model Rule 5.5 as well as several Model provisions in
order to promote a national practice of law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2012).
Unfortunately, some states refused to follow the Model Rules, and, in fact, enacted more stringent
controls on out-of-state lawyers practicing law within their jurisdictions. State Implementation of
ABA
MJP Policies, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional-responsibility/recommendations.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013)
(showing state policies on multijurisdictional practice). The rules for in-house counsel ended up far
worse off after the ABA efforts than before the ABA efforts. See Arthur F. Greenbaum,
MultijurisdictionalPractice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 - An
Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REv. 729, 758-61 (2010) (discussing unintended consequences of
Rule 5.5). In part, the ABA did not properly educate the state bars and the state supreme courts in an
effort to obtain wider adoption of the ABA positions. See Greenbaum, supra, at 737-42 (discussing
state variations to Rule 5.5).
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to deal with lawyer-provided ancillary business services.240 It expressly
required that such services be provided only to the clients of the law firm
and it required disclosure to the clients. 24' But, in 1994, the ABA House
of Delegates replaced this Rule with a provision that resembles what
exists today.242 The existing practices of law firms that provided
ancillary business services such as title work, real estate brokerage
services, and lobbying were significantly threatened by the 1991 version
of the Rule.24 3 Thus, the new version made several compromises that

simply ignored key questions about ancillary business services. 244 Must
a client be told about a lawyer's investment in an ancillary business? If
the client is told that the services are distinct from legal services, must

they be given an opportunity to obtain those business services from
another provider? Can lawyers accept referral fees from nonlawyers for
245
sending clients to the nonlaw business provider without disclosure?
The point is that important issues continue to be left unresolved because

of the problems with addressing fundamental reform in the ABA House
of Delegates.

Another example in the 2000s involved the consideration of
multidisciplinary practice ("MDP") of law.246 A very important MDP

Commission led by Sherwin Simmons and Mary Daly was unable to
persuade the ABA House of Delegates to accept any meaningful reform
on alternative ways of delivering legal services.247 Thus, the ABA chose

to ignore developments in this area and fell behind in regulating such
lawyer and nonlawyer partnerships in delivering legal services. Some in
the ABA viewed this as a major victory for the core principles of
lawyering, especially after the involvement of Arthur Andersen in the
Enron scandal.248 However, this "victory" ignores the existence of MDPs
240. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1992); Dennis J. Block et al., Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.7: Its Origin and Interpretation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 800-02
(1992).
241. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1992).
242. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1994).
243. See Block et al., supra note 240, at 797-801.
244. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1994) (containing the new Rule
5.7), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1992) (containing the old Rule 5.7).
245. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Conflicts of Interest in Lawyer Referral
Arrangements with Nonlawyer Professionals,21 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 206 (2008) (stating that
the Model Rules do not address the issue of a lawyer making referrals to a nonlawyer).
246. See Paul D. Paton, MultidisciplinaryPractice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2203-04 (2010) (discussing the
ABA debates concerning MDP).
247. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPractice,supra note 233, at 127-28, 14647.
248. See Paton, supra note 246, at 2205-06 (discussing the argument that lawyers would
continue to "expand multidimensional professional service offerings").
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in this country that go unregulated. 249 And, it simply let other countries
move into a leadership role in regulating MDPs ° In retrospect, the
ABA's decision was extremely shortsighted and shows a significant
weakness in how lawyers are regulated in this country.
In 2009, many welcomed with great hope ABA President Lamm's
announcement of the creation of Ethics 20/20 in order to conduct a
comprehensive review of the Model Rules in light of developments in
technology and global law practice.25 ' Some of the promise came from
the fact that Lamm had an international law practice background and
realized that the regulation of lawyering could no longer be contained
within national borders.252 However, the Commission, faced with the
political pressures of advancing change in the ABA, abandoned efforts
to change Rules dealing with multijurisdictional practice, nonlawyer
ownership in law firms,2 53 and alternative litigation financing.254
Excellent working papers were produced, but no effort was made to
address these issues within the regulatory structure of the Model
Rules.255 Instead of presenting a comprehensive set of changes that
fundamentally reformed the entire document, Ethics 20/20 proposed a
few piecemeal Model Rules changes to the ABA House of Delegates,
which were ultimately adopted.25 6 It is an understatement to say that the

final work product of Ethics 20/20 was a major disappointment to those
who believed that the Model Rules needed significant revision in light of
the changes in the legal profession.

249. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPractice,supra note 233, at 149.
250. See Sydney M. Cone, III, InternationalLegal PracticeInvolving England and New York
Following Adoption of the United Kingdom Legal Services Act of 2007, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
415, 422, 424 (2008) (stating that the United Kingdom studied alternative business arrangements
and implemented a system for regulating them in delivering legal services to the public).
251. See Gillers, How to Make Rulesfor Lawyers, supranote 19, at 397-98.
252. See Carolyn Lamm Named to the National Law Journal's 2013 "100 Most Influential
Lawyers in America" List, WHITE & CASE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.whitecase.com/awards03262013/#.Ui5avxZxvBw (recognizing Lamm for her work in the field of international law).
253. Gillers, How to Make Rulesfor Lawyers, supra note 19, at 400-01 (discussing the decision
of Ethics 20/20 to abandon consideration of any Rule that would allow nonlawyer ownership in a
law firm).
254. James Podgers, Ethics 20/20 Commission Suspends Campaign to Draft a Proposal on
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:06 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ethics_20_20_commission suspendscampaign_to_draft_a
.proposal on nonlawyer.
255. See Work Product, supra note 109 (providing numerous drafts, proposals, and papers
regarding changes to the Model Rules).
256. See House of Delegates Filings, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/abacommission on ethics_20 20/house of delegates filings.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (summarizing that various reports and resolutions to the ABA House of
Delegates have been filed over time).
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Despite the ABA's dominance in the promulgation of the ethics
codes over the years, the ABA has lost much effective power over
fundamental reform. In other words, the structure of the ABA is such
that few, if any, fundamental reforms have any chance of adoption by
the ABA House of Delegates. Thus, the drafting committees are either
left with preparing something that would be certain to be rejected, such
as the efforts with MDP, or drafting piecemeal changes that can be
adopted, but, in the end, do not address issues of fundamental reform.
Some may argue that the changes made in 2003 with respect to
confidentiality and corporate entity fraud constituted fundamental
reform that undercuts this analysis. 257 But, those changes were made
under the threat of Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
rulemaking that would have preempted the effect of state ethics rules on
confidentiality.25 8 Thus, the ABA, faced with losing complete control
over regulating the disclosure duties of corporate lawyers, chose to make
changes that were likely to forestall more aggressive SEC action.
Some might argue that the changes adopted by the
Multijurisdictional Practice of Law Commission ("MJP Commission")
were another prominent example of fundamental reform. 259 The MJP
Commission did address a growing problem of lawyers practicing across
state lines and took a rather progressive approach to the issue.26 ° The
issue had existed for years, but lawyers had practiced in other
jurisdictions with few consequences. 261 The issue of out-of-state practice
was raised to a crisis level when the California Supreme Court decided
that an out-of-state law firm could not collect a fee for representing a
client in an arbitration proceeding conducted in California.2 62 This
decision gave the ABA a national imperative to produce quick and
257. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Foreword: Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional
Responsibility as Usual, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 1173, 1176-77 (supporting the ABA's adoption of
revisions to Rules 1.6 and 1.13).
258. See id (noting that ABA revisions of Rules 1.6 and 1.13 were consistent with related SEC
rules).
259. Professors Gillers and Green were instrumental in producing an excellent report and
advocating the need for change with the ABA. See Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct - Meeting Minutes, ABA (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/02_02mtg.html.
260. See Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the MultyurisdictionalPracticeCommission: The Art
of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 712-16 (2002) [hereinafter Gillers, Lessons from the
MultijurisdictionalPractice].
261. See Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional
Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, S. TEX. L. REV., Nov. 1995, at 665, 685-86
(noting that many lawyers are not disciplined for practicing law in jurisdictions in which they are
not admitted).
262. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Conon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 3, 13
(Cal. 1998).
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effective reform,263 and the MJP Commission produced a revision of
Rule 5.5 and several other pronouncements on an expedited schedule.2 6
Rule 5.5 has been adopted in many states; however, some states have
imposed their own special rules to restrict some types of out-of-state
presence within their borders.265 Most of these efforts have been directed
at in-house counsel. And, some have imposed limits on pro hac vice and
other types of representations.266 The MJP Commission sought to
accomplish fundamental reform in an area of significant confusion;
however, localized anticompetitive sentiments led some states away
from the ABA mission to liberalize cross-border practice.26 7 Such state
efforts threaten the power of the ABA and demonstrate why fundamental
reform will be difficult to achieve.
In my view, the ABA should examine its rulemaking in a
systematic way and create a structure that is able to implement effective
change. Currently, Model Rules are developed and adopted the same
way the ABA adopts all changes-through the House of Delegates
structure. 22668 The key is to reform the process of promulgating Rules so
that interest politics are lessened, and the resulting ethics Code reflects
significant thought and research to achieve a consensus.269 Perhaps, the
Center for Professional Responsibility could undertake a more active

263. Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice, supra note 260, at 686-89
(speculating on whether Birbrowerwas the perfect storm in terms of holding, state, and implications
across the country). Birbrower involved an out-of-state arbitration agreed upon by the parties,
handled by New York lawyers for a California corporation (whose major shareholder was a New
York citizen) and a New York client. See Birbrower,Montalbano, Conon & Frank, P.C., 949 P.2d
at 3; Gillers, Lessonsfrom the MultijurisdictionalPractice,supra note 260, at 689 n.22.
264. The ABA issued model guidelines on topics such as admission, admission on motion,
licensing of a legal consultant, and temporary practice by foreign lawyers. See Commission on
MultijurisdictionalPractice:About the Commission, supranote 88.
265. See Carol A. Needham, The Changing Landscape for In-House Counsel:
MultijurisdictionalPracticeConsiderationsfor Corporate Law Departments, 43 AKRON L. REV.
985, 997-98 (2010).
266. See, e.g., Jane Hawthorne Merrill, Note, MultijurisdictionalPracticeof Law Under the
Revised South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, 57 S.C. L. REV. 549, 557-60 (2006)
(discussing South Carolina's limiting of pro hac vice admission).
267. Wolfram, supra note 261, at 681.
268. Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers, supranote 19, at 410.
269. Gillers has proposed that the drafting and approval process include a burden of proof
concept. See id at 408-10. Gillers proposed:
[Blurden of proof should be identified and defended when the wisdom of a rule is based
on predictions about future harm. Furthermore, when a proposed rule interferes with the
economic liberty of lawyers and clients, the proponents should presumptively have
some, even if modest, obligation to justify the interference.
Id. at 410. Such a standard would limit somewhat attacks on proposed changes based upon selfinterest and anti-competitiveness by requiring the opponents to demonstrate that the proposal
undercuts legitimate core interests of lawyer regulation.
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role in the reform process by making a systematic and periodic review of
the Rules and formulating draft proposals for change.
Obviously, empowering key individuals within the ABA structure
would go a long way towards implementing change. Much of the work
of the ABA committees is driven by the personalities of the leaders. A
strong leader with a clear agenda can push through much work, while a
less focused leader will not be able to put much on the agenda.
Personalities make a great deal of difference in the way in which
rulemaking can take place. Professor Stephen Gillers has proposed that
the drafting committees include nonlawyers so as to represent the
interests of the public and to aid in drafting Rules that can be understood
by nonlawyers.2 70 Aside from changes in structure, the ABA needs to
create a vehicle for educating its House of Delegates about the need for
Rule changes, and how the proposals address those needs.
Up to this point, this discussion has focused upon the design of
codes of ethics for all lawyers. Some scholars have argued that some
legal ethics issues that arise in specific contexts of law practice cannot
be adequately addressed in general ethics codes.2 71 As the argument
goes, such issues require regulations that are context specific.272 In other
words, a well-designed ethics rules system for regulating lawyers could
impose specific and different rules for tax lawyers, banking lawyers, and
securities lawyers.273 In some cases, those rules are codified into statutes
and regulations, but in other cases, they may simply be part of projects
that produce guidelines.274 In the area of legal ethics, the ABA has been
involved in drafting and presenting to its House of Delegates for
approval Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice. 75 Such
270. Id. at 410-11. Ronald Minkoff, a partner in the firm of Frankfurt, Kurnit, Klein, & Selz,
P.C. and a leading lawyer involved in legal ethics committees in New York and in the ABA, makes
a powerful and persuasive argument for the inclusion of client perspectives in the drafting process.
As Minkoff states, the only client present at the table is the Association of Corporate Counsel
organization that represents, through their in-house lawyers, the corporate clients that receive legal
services on a continual basis.
271. See generally David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: RegulatingLawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993) (discussing the inability of general ethics rules to address
the needs of certain firms in specific contexts).
272. See id. at 1151-54.
273. See id. (supporting context based regulation). But see Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W.
Tuttle, Legal Representation in a PluralistSociety, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 998 n.77 (1995)
(examining some of the costs of context specific regulation of lawyers).
274. See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, intro., at xiii-xiv (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice_
standards/prosecution defense function.authcheckdam.pdf (providing guidance to prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys).
275. See Criminal Justice Section: Criminal Justice Standards Committee, ABA,
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standards are extremely detailed guidelines for prosecutors and defense
lawyers in the practice of criminal law.276 They form best practices
through the creation of "soft," nonbinding legal principles, rather than
codes of conduct adopted by state bars.277 Such standards have become
extremely valuable in criminal law practice.2 78 One can see that this
form of contextual regulation, utilizing the soft law approach, should be
expanded to other areas of the law.
B. Improving Clarity of the Concepts
Rule drafting is a difficult task, particularly when rules are written
in light of past practices but then must be interpreted in a changing legal
profession. Language written in the early 1980s is tested thirty years
later. It is difficult to find a code that would not need change during that
length of time.
Before I examine a few specific Rules where open terms and vague
concepts hinder uniform interpretation, one should consider carefully
two important lines of scholarship that have examined the Model Rules
in detail. In one of these lines of scholarship, Professor Nancy Moore
eloquently discusses how many provisions in the Model Rules fail to
address whether scienter is needed to prove a violation.279 Scienter, or
mens rea, of the actor is included in some of the Rules, but its absence in
other Rules raises questions, such as whether the drafters intended a
strict liability standard.2a 0 Although this article generated much
discussion and debate, 281 Ethics 20/20 failed to methodically examine
the Rules to implement a systematic consideration of lawyer scienter.
Such an effort would have signaled to the profession that the ABA is
concerned about enforcement and would resolve the serious questions
raised by Moore's article.282 Instead, I count this as another important
failure of the Ethics 20/20 project.

http://www.apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfn?com=CR105000 (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
276. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supranote 274, intro., at xiii-xiv.
277. See id.
278. See CriminalJusticeSection: CriminalJustice Standards Committee, supra note 275.
279. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010) (discussing the fact that many of the Model Rules do not require a
specific mental state in order for a lawyer to be in violation of the Rule).
280. Id. at 11-25 (examining arguments for strict liability).
281. See, e.g., Donald R. Lundberg, Mental State Under the Rules of ProfessionalConduct,
RES GESTAE, Sept. 2010, at 23, 23.
282. See Moore, supra note 279, at 31 (discussing how Ethics 20/20 failed to discuss the use of
strict liability for Rule 1.7).
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Under the other line of scholarship, several scholars have advocated
a contractarian approach to legal ethics, 28 3 and argued that the Rules
should be subject to modification by lawyer-client agreement. For
example, some argue that corporate clients and sophisticated parties
have better information about which conflicts of interest rules are
important to them and which can be changed by contract.284 In several
places in the Rules, lawyers and clients can agree to change the default
rules, but scholars have argued that the ABA should expand the number
of Rules that could be subject to modification by contract.28 5 Professor
Richard W. Painter contends that the Model Rules could be substantially
improved by making clear which Rules are default-based standards,
subject to opt-out by agreement, and which Rules are immutable.28 6
Additionally, he argues that lawyers and law firms could have
opt-in rules that bridge the gap in areas where the current Codes
do not adequately protect clients.2 87 In other words, clients and
lawyers could agree to increase the standards based upon their
particular circumstances.2 88
Some have argued that, even under the current Rules, lawyers
should feel free to modify rules that are not expressly restricted from
modification.289 In other words, if the current language of the Rule does
not prohibit agreement with the client, the lawyer should be able to use
reasonable agreements to implement the rules. An example of such an
argument involves Rule 1.8(g), which requires a lawyer who participates
in an aggregate settlement agreement to inform each client about the
details of the settlement received by the other clients.290 Some scholars
argue that clients should be able to delegate the power to accept an
aggregate settlement agreement in advance to a lawyer, and the lawyer's
division of the proceeds could be done in accordance with a
predetermined formula.291 In light of these arguments, one would think
283. See generally Painter, supra note 195 (advocating for a contractarian approach to legal
ethics). Professor Richard W. Painter advocates additional default and opt-in rules, along with law
firms developing their own codes of ethics to govern their law practices. See id. at 732-34.
284. See Jones & Davis, supra note 167, at 591-92, 595-96; Painter, supra note 195, at 683-84.
285. See Painter, supra note 195, at 684, 718 (advocating for an expansion of the number of
rules that could be subject to modification by contract).
286. Id. at 670, 731. Professor Larry E. Ribstein advocates that many ethics rules should be
default rules capable of modification. See Ribstein, supra note 118, at 1753-56.
287. Painter, supra note 195, at 734.
288. For example, some clients could insist that their law firms adopt a higher standard on
conflicts of interest during their representation and memorialize such language in the retainer
agreement. See id. at 682.
289. See id. at 674-78.
290.
291.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012).
See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rules,
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that the ABA would address these situations in its review of the Rules,
and make considered judgments about when a contractarian model might
be desirable. However, except for the amendment of the Comments to
Rule 8.5 involving choice-of-ethics law, 92 Ethics 20/20 largely ignored
this model in its review and revision of the Rules. Although I am
somewhat skeptical that the contractarian model should occupy a
dominant role in the regulation of lawyers, 293 Ethics 20/20's failure to
address these questions leaves open arguments that lawyers can contract
around individual ethics Rules.
Since its adoption, the Model Rules has contained a section of
definitions. Currently, the terminology section defines fourteen terms.2 94
In some of the Comments throughout the Rules, the drafters have sought
to include definitional concepts.2 95 However, the Rules often leave
important concepts open and thus subject to interpretation. This allows
lawyers and law firms to argue that Rules do not apply to their situation.
The most obvious examples arise in the conflicts of interest rules.
In the 1983 version of the Model Rules, the ABA included Model Rule
2.2 on the lawyer as intermediary.2 96 The first Comment stated that a
lawyer acts as an intermediary when representing conflicting interests.2 97
The problem was that very few lawyers ever admitted to practicing
intermediation. 298 The definition was sufficiently overbroad and vague
that lawyers effectively could choose whether or not they fell within
its requirements.
Other problems exist in the conflicts of interest rules. The courts
have developed different interpretations of the concept of "substantially

32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 733, 763-64 (1997). But see Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation
vs. Case Administration: The ALl Looks at Legal Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 734, 741-43 (2011) (discussing cases and ethics opinions discouraging aggregate
settlement agreements); Carol A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflecting
on Attorneys' Fiduciary Obligations and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
511, 513-16 (2012) (discussing the shortcomings of aggregate settlements).
292. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. (2012).
293. In my view, the application of the contractarian approach may be workable in at least
some circumstances when the only interests at stake in a Rule are client interests and the client
provides informed consent to the variance in the Rule to be applied to the lawyer's conduct. But,
when other important interests are at stake, such as protecting the legal system or third persons, the
varying standards resulting from a contractarian approach would impose costs upon those outside of
the bargain and makes that approach seem far less workable and appropriate in those circumstances.
294. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2012).
295. See, e.g., id. R. 4.2 cmt. (referring to Rule 1.0(f) to define what knowledge means as
applied to Rule 4.2).
296. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (1983).
297. See id.
R. 2.2 cmt.
298. See Dzienkowski, supra note 56, at 768-70 (discussing the failure of Rule 2.2 to include a
coherent definition of the word "intermediary").
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related" matters, and the Model Rules define the concept but take no
position on which interpretation should govern. 299 The Ethics 2000
revision of the Model Rules introduced the concept of a personal conflict
of interest into Model Rules 1.7 and 1.10; however, the term "personal
conflict of interest" is not adequately defined.300 When the Rules fail to
define such a term precisely, lawyers are essentially left to develop and
apply their own interpretations of the concept to determine whether a
conflict exists or whether imputation of the conflict to the firm
must occur.
There are many other areas in which terms and concepts are not
properly defined. The Rules dealing with contingent fees largely
presume the typical or standard personal injury contingent fee, but do
not recognize the many other types of contingent and hybrid fee
structures that have been developed in recent years. 30 1 The failure of the
ABA to monitor and keep current a Rule on such a basic issue as fees
demonstrates the ABA's view that either change is too difficult to adopt
and implement through the ABA's regulatory structure, or that basic
concepts can be reinterpreted by lawyers and others, without any change
needing to be made in the language of the rules, when developments
occur in practice.
Apart from the drafting of ethics Codes, the ABA has used its
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility to draft
302
formal ethics opinions. In a typical year, this committee issues three or
four opinions on a wide-ranging array of topics. 30 3 Some of the topics
address how new technology interacts with the application of Model
299. See Mamie Smith, Comment, Recent Attitudes Toward the "SubstantialRelation" Test
Where There Are Multiple Clients in Successive Relationships, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 301, 306-10
(1991) (discussing the substantial relationship test).
300. See STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 33, at 25-26, 40-41. Comments 10, 11,
and 12 give examples of financial interests, personal relationships, and sexual relationships as
personal conflicts of interest, respectively. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt.
(2012). If an affected lawyer's conflict resulted from a business partnership that the lawyer had with
another lawyer or witness, is that a personal conflict or a professional conflict? Suppose the conflict
arises from a remote ownership in real estate, such as a potential beneficiary-is that a personal or
professional conflict?
301. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2012).
302. See generally ABA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION, AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
(1971), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AND OTHER
SELECTED STANDARDS INCLUDING CALIFORNIA RULES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 457

(1991) (tasking the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility with
drafting ethics opinions).
303. See Ethics Opinions: Latest Opinions, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/publications/ethicsopinions.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2013)
(showing the latest ethics opinions issued).
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Rules.3 °4 In some cases, the ethics opinions seek to expand upon
concepts in the Codes, but in other cases, they attempt to resolve
questions that have been left open by the drafters.
Ethics opinions can play an important role in the development of
the law of lawyering. New practices and new technology can fall within
existing Rules, and the issuance of an ethics opinion can give lawyers
comfort in how to resolve a particular problem. °5 However, it is dubious
to use ethics opinions to fill in clarity when the drafters chose to leave
language that is open to interpretation. And, of course, it is improper for
the drafters of ethics opinions to reinterpret Rules to say what they
clearly do not say, as this essentially gives the opinion drafters the power
to change the meaning of the Codes without going through the ABA
rulemaking procedures.3 °6
The ABA, either through the Center for Professional Responsibility
or through another body, should keep track of when ethics opinions and
judicial opinions address interpretive issues that are not answered within
the Rules.30 7 And, it should add interpretive comments that improve the

clarity and the application of the Rules for regulating lawyers. Of course,
the ABA could decide to let a particular Rule percolate in terms of
options for interpretation in the courts and ethics committees. And, in
such cases, those Rules could make clear that the ABA is not making a
choice on an interpretive question at that particular time, and that a
decision will be made in the future. The choices on drafting need to be
made with intellectual rigor, backed by high standards of analysis,
research, and scholarship.30 8
With all of the resources available to the ABA, it should be able to
keep track of developments, and, instead of simply reporting on them,
use such developments in methodically improving the Rules. The

304. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 459 (2011)
(discussing a lawyer's duty of confidentiality under the Model Rules in light of new smartphone
technology).
305. See id
306. See Lawrence K. Hellman, When "Ethics Rules" Don't Mean What They Say: The
Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 334-36 (1997)
(arguing that the committee should use a more principled view of interpreting ethics codes when
issuing opinions). For an excellent article critiquing the analysis of ABA ethics opinions
interpreting the Model Code, see Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of the Bar
Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA
Committee on Ethics andProfessionalResponsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 67-90 (1981).
307. Professor Gillers calls for the creation of a permanent committee to "foresee issues when
or even before they appear above the horizon and to gather the data that will assist the organization
before it is imperative to respond." Gillers, How to Make Rulesfor Lawyers, supra note 19, at 412.
308. Professor Gillers refers to this as a requirement of intellectual quality. See id. at 406.
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regulation of lawyers is a seamless web that needs careful monitoring
and the ABA should facilitate a careful study of the Rules in action.
C. Focusingon Interests at Stake andAnticipating
Enforcement of the Provisions
In the 1990s, David Wilkins and others wrote powerful articles
examining the regulation of the legal profession. 30 9 Those articles
examined the Rules from the perspective of the interests at stake.3 1° Is a
particular ethics rule seeking to protect the client, the court, the legal
profession, or third persons? Interest stake analysis would help
significantly in the development of the Model Rules.
In drafting Rules for regulating lawyers' conduct, the ABA should
anticipate how such Rules would be enforced. In other words, is it likely
that the Rules will be enforced through the disciplinary process, the
malpractice lawsuit, or in a litigation forum? Each forum in which the
rule is likely to be enforced has different evidentiary rules and requires
different standards of proof. Disciplinary cases in most states are
processed through an administrative tribunal, and the inquiry is quite
often limited to the narrow question of whether the lawyer violated a
provision of the state ethics code.311 Malpractice cases that involve direct
adversity between the lawyer and the former client or injured person
could eventually end up before a jury.3 12 Litigation sanctions fall under
the power of the judge to manage litigation and enforce the rules of the
tribunal.3 13 On the most basic level, these sanctions will include conflicts
of interest disqualification motions, where the interests of the current
client and the lawyer are usually aligned, but they could involve other
matters as well.
Malpractice and disciplinary cases typically arise months and years
after the conduct in question. Some of the documentary evidence may no
longer be available. Issues of proof are important, but much of the proof
may be present only in the memories of the witnesses (which may be
hazy after the passage of years). In malpractice cases, plaintiffs will use
the discovery process to gain access to law firm records and the
testimony of the responsible actors. 314 In the disciplinary case, the power
309. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 25, at 803-04.
310. Seee.g.,idat815-17.
311. See Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline,supranote 182, at 3-4.
312. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 1105-06 (giving an example of a malpractice case in
which there was a jury verdict).
313. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Breen, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of
Lawyers, 70 OHo ST. L.J. 73, 99-100 (2009).
314. See generally Thomas P. McGarry & Robert A. Chapman, Litigating the Legal
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of the state bar prosecutor to compel production of records will be the
primary means of gaining access to the information.3 15 In drafting Rules
that are likely to be enforced in the discipline and malpractice context,
the ABA should take such factors into account.
For example, where the Model Rules call for lawyers to conduct an
analysis or evaluation, the Rules should require that such evaluation be
supported by research and a lawyer's affirmation that the analysis has
been conducted and the applicable standard has been met. In the current
conflicts of interest area, a law firm should be required to conduct a
careful review to determine whether it can provide competent and
diligent representation to all affected clients. Best practices could require
that such a determination be supported by research, and the lawyers in
question must personally sign off on this analysis.) 6 Another safeguard
would be to have another lawyer, not involved in the representation, to
sign off on the decision.317 Additionally, such documentary proof should
be kept in the firm's records for at least five years after the
representation. The ABA has started down this path in adopting its
modifications to Model Rule 1.10 regarding migratory lawyers.3 18 The
screening under Model Rule 1.10 is far more rigorous than the screening
under Model Rules 1.11 or 1.1 8. 3 '9 Heightened screening with a
certification requirement is something that needs to be put into place in
all of the screening contexts. And, the failure of Ethics 20/20 to
recommend such an important but modest modification to the Rules
is disappointing.

MalpracticeCase, in ATTORNEYS' LEGAL LIABILITY ch. 6 (2012) (describing the discovery process
in a malpractice case).
315. ELIZABETH SIMON ET AL., FINAL REPORT TO THE NYSBA PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
COMMITrEE:

DISCOVERY,

SUBPOENA

POWER

AND

EVIDENCE

RULES

IN

DISCIPLINARY

PROCEEDINGS (2009) (providing a state-by-state summary of discovery procedures in disciplinary
proceedings), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section-DiscoverySubpoena_
Power and Evidence Rules in Disciplinary Proceedings.
316. Certification by the lawyers who make the decision will provide evidentiary evidence of
who analyzed the legal problem and made the determination, and will force those individuals to take
the analysis more seriously. It will broaden law firm concern about ethics issues to topics other than
conflicts of interest.
317. This would work in all firms except when the lawyer is a solo practitioner.
318. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2012) (requiring (1) prompt written
notice, (2) written description of the screening procedures, (3) acknowledgement that judicial
review may examine the screening procedures, (4) agreement to respond promptly to inquiries about
screening, and (5) certifications by the screened lawyer and a partner at reasonable intervals
affirming compliance with the screen).
319. Compare id. (noting the rigorous screening procedure for imputation of conflicts of
interest with current clients), with id. R. 1.11 (noting the less rigorous screening procedure for
conflicts of interest concerning former clients), and id. R. 1.18 (noting the less rigorous screening
procedure concerning prospective clients).
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Some might be concerned that this effort to establish access to
evidence is likely to expose lawyers to much more liability. However,
both malpractice law and disciplinary law would acknowledge a
profession's efforts to establish best practices. Identifying the types of
common cases in which lawyers may encounter disciplinary and
malpractice exposure and proposing standards of best practices would
help to guide lawyers in these areas.
In situations in which a Rule is likely to be enforced in the context
of litigation as well as the disciplinary process, the drafters of the Rules
should acknowledge the regulatory context in formulating the text and
Comments of the Rule. In some cases, the client's and the lawyer's
interests are aligned and in other circumstances they are in tension, and
that factor should affect the design of the particular rule. For the ABA to
continue to insist that the Model Rules are only to be used for
enforcement in the disciplinary context simply ignores the realities of
practice and results in less effective lawyer regulation.
D. Acquiring EmpiricalData to Support Analysis in Rules Drafting
Drafting ethics Codes is a challenging task because the Rules are
drafted based upon assumptions that the drafters have about the practice
of law. The ABA sought to create committees with adequate
representation of different aspects of law practice. Collectively such
committees were given the task of drafting Rules that would apply in
every single context of lawyering. 320 Academic reporters were used in
order to provide the drafters with access to the research scholarship in
professional responsibility. 321 Of course, the committees sought to
protect certain core values of legal practice, but, in the end, the task was
an application of rough justice.
In more recent years, commissions have held hearings across the
country and received written and verbal testimony about various
issues.322 The hearings process, however, has become an advocacy
session for the various interested parties who have a stake in either a
change in the Code or the status quo. Thus, hearings that were designed
to investigate lawyer practices turned into advocacy sessions. I do not
mean to suggest that hearings be discontinued; however, I do believe
that their usefulness is often overstated. At the present time, hearings on
320. See id. scope (noting that the Model Rules take into account the larger context shaping
lawyers' roles).
321. The Wright Committee that was responsible for drafting the Model Code used the
American Bar Foundation for its research concerning ethics issues. See Wright, supra note 36,
at 2-3.
322. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, supra note 110.
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changes in ethics Codes involve the collection of information from those
with the most to gain or lose from a change in the current Code. Perhaps
the leadership of the committees could mitigate this problem by
requiring disclosure of self-interest and representation of clients in such
hearings.32 3 It could also separate presentations involving factual
information about topics from those involving advocacy in favor of or
opposed to change of the current Rules. Thus, the ABA should try to
minimize the role of interest groups in shaping the evidence gathering
process that is needed to properly draft changes to the ethics Codes.
In the Ethics 20/20 process, the Commission has produced working
papers with significant information about cutting edge ethics issues in
law practice.32 4 The working papers on alternative litigation financing,
outsourcing, and cloud computing have put together significant research
on these practices.3 25 But, as research papers, these documents are
limited in their usefulness. The Ethics 20/20 Commission needed access
to data about current law firm practices and the extent to which law
firms are already engaged in such efforts. They also needed access to the
contracts and experiential information about these practices.
Law firms are private entities that do not disclose their methods of
practice or detailed information about their financial operations. The
attorney-client relationship is a confidential one and few incentives exist
for lawyers or clients to disclose information.326 There is often no
incentive for law firms to disclose information regarding their practices
or issues. In fact, practices can grow and thrive under the radar for
decades.327 This leads to the conclusion that the ABA and the states
cannot effectively regulate a profession where the information about the

323. Model Rule 6.4 permits lawyers to belong to the ABA and to work on the reform of its
Rules; however, it requires disclosure that a position will materially benefit the interests of a client.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.4 (2012).

324. See INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note 11, at 1 (submitting various resolutions
and reports to the ABA House of Delegates).
325. See id.
326. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012) (defining the scope of
confidentiality within the attorney-client relationship).
327. Law firm equity investments in clients existed in the 1950s and 1960s. See Christine Hurt,
Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest in Their Clients in a PostEnron World Are "Selling Out," Not "Buying In," 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 913 & n.96 (2003).
Outsourcing has been going on for decades. See Steve Homan, Legal Outsourcing Summarized:
New Business Paradigm in the 2d Decade of 21st Century, YAHOO! VOICES (Sept. 21, 2012),
And,
http://www.voices.yahoo.com/legal-outsourcing-summarized-business-9138769.html?cat-3.
alternative litigation financing similarly has existed under the radar for many years. See Maya
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-PartyLitigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268,

1271, 1277-78 (2011).
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practices and the stresses they place on lawyers and law firms is not used
to craft the Rules.328
The Center for Professional Responsibility is an excellent resource
for studying the legal profession.3 2 9 However, it is more of a repository
for information than a research arm. The Center for Professional
Responsibility puts on some excellent conferences and it publishes
several books that provide invaluable information to the profession.33 °
The American Bar Foundation has, in the past, sponsored many research
efforts in the legal profession. 331 However, resource issues have
constrained funding directed at discovering information about the legal
profession. Many academics have conducted impressive empirical work
in numerous areas of legal ethics, and these projects show the benefits
that could be obtained if the ABA backed a systematic plan for empirical
research about the legal profession and important legal ethics issues.332
The ABA and the legal profession would benefit significantly from
a coordinated effort to conduct empirical research about lawyer and law
firm practices in action.333 To be effective, such research requires the
cooperation of law firms and their lawyer members. The ABA should
strongly encourage its members to assist the organization in conducting
328. Professor Gillers argues about the need for empirical research, and he states that in many
areas the different rules in the states provide the real world in which to test assumptions. See Gillers,
How to Make Rules for Lawyers, supra note 19, at 375-77. He uses as an example the different
confidentiality rules across the states, and posits that empirical work could test many guesses that
we currently make about how confidentiality rules work in practice. Id. Gillers also states that the
profession should be honest about the assumptions it makes, and, if they are not based upon
empirical evidence, the profession should indicate that fact. See id.
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http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/resources.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2013).
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(listing current and past projects of the American Bar Foundation).
332. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 1-6 (rev. ed. 1994) (describing the scope of the research and the data set
presented within the book); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Taking Empirical Research Seriously, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1473, 1475-76 (2009) (describing the growth of the prevalence of empirical
research on the legal profession).
333. Professor Gillers proposes that "[a]ny factual prediction of dire or beneficial
consequences if a rule is or is not adopted should be supported with credible empirical research if
possible." Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers, supra note 19, at 407. If the answers are not
capable of being obtained through empirical research, Gillers argues that the proponents must
indicate that no evidence exists and make persuasive arguments that bear a substantial burden of
proof. See id. at 408.
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meaningful research studies in lawyering. The requirement for
cooperation would be accompanied by an ABA obligation of anonymity
and confidentiality so as to help gather accurate information. Some
of the information that is needed is factual, other information
involves a study of firm culture and lawyer opinions, and some
information would help researchers study lawyers from a behavioral
economics perspective.334
Although the current process has gathered significant anecdotal
evidence about law practice, it has not put together the kind of concrete
information needed to help the drafting commissions. Such a
coordinated effort would substantially improve ABA efforts to regulate
lawyers. Although it is impossible to list all of the projects that would
help with the drafting of effective ethics rules, one could easily identify
topics in conflicts, ancillary business practices, MDP, pro bono efforts,
advertising, and fees as ones that would provide important information
to the drafters.
E. Acknowledging the Way in Which Law Firms Make Decisions
Many scholars have turned to researching the way in which law
firms comply with codes of ethics. 335 This work has examined the role of
management committees, ethics counsel, firm discipline, malpractice,
and conflicts disqualification in law firm decisionmaking. 336 The
scholarship in this area examines firms as organizations that are
important players in the regulation of lawyers.337 In firms, the
infrastructure to manage firm compliance has become known as risk
management.33 8 And therefore, a comprehensive and careful study
of these organizations must be central to the proper design of the
Model Rules.339
Different rules come into play at different times in a representation.
Some are directed at the formation of the attorney-client
334. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 77-79 (1993) (presenting a
behavioral economics inquiry into lawyer complicity with client fraud).
335. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructurein Large Law Firms:A Callfor Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691,
702-04 (2002) (presenting research on the ethical infrastructure of law firms).
336. See id. at 705-07.
337. See id. at 692.
338. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (2008).
339. See id. at 102-03; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Nested Ethics: A Tale of Two Cultures, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 143, 149-52 (2013) (examining the way in which empirical research could assist
in affecting lawyer decisionmaking about ethical conduct).
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representation, 340 others at discovering conflicts, 341 and others at the
termination of the representation.3 42 Some rules address litigation
practice, while others address all law practice.343 Law firms effect
compliance with different rules through different decisionmaking
structures. For certain rules, law firms vest the authority in a
management committee. 344 In recent years, some law firms have used an
ethics partner or an ethics committee.34 5 Still, other law firms
decentralize compliance with ethics rules into an intake partner for new
matters, and then the partners in charge from that point on.346 These
compliance structures should inform both the design of a rule and the
education that needs to follow enactment of a rule.347
The study of firm structure is important for several reasons. The
drafting of the Model Rules can be significantly improved if the ABA
had data on how small, medium, and large firms have complied with the
current Rules.348 The data would include law firm attitudes towards a
particular Rule, as well as the costs of compliance. And, the data would
enable the ABA to share information in broad ways that would help
firms to develop better compliance structures. The study of firm culture
on many levels is an important inquiry that could significantly improve
the drafting of Model Rules.349
V.

CONCLUSION

The regulation of lawyers has progressed significantly in the last
century. The ABA has been active in trying to respond to the changes in
the legal profession and must be commended for its efforts at innovation.
The problem is that the current ABA structures, which have worked
340. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (providing the Model Rule
that covers "Competence").
341. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7 (providing the Model Rule that covers "Conflict of Interest: Current
Clients").
342. See, e.g., id. R. 1.16 (providing the Model Rule that covers "Declining or Terminating
Representation").
343. See, e.g., id R. 8.3 (providing the Model Rule that covers "Reporting Professional
Misconduct").
344. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 335, at 705-06 (discussing the roles of ethics
advisors and committees in law firms).
345. See id. at 698.
346. See Davis, supranote 338, at 100-01, 117.
347. See id. at 107, 109-10.
348. Much more research work needs to be done with respect to solo and small law firm
practitioners and the ways in which these lawyers comply with the ethics Rules. The costs of
compliance and the attitudes of the lawyers play an important role in determining whether the Rules
are followed in practice.
349. See generally Regan, supra note 339 (examining the influence of various spheres of
culture and values upon a law firm infrastructure).
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reasonably well in the past, can no longer support the kinds of changes
that need to be made in today's globalized law practice world.35 °
The success of the ABA has, in turn, become a major reason why
change is difficult to implement. When the ABA examines a Rule, it
must ask whether the Rule is working well enough that the costs of
changing the Rule exceed the benefits of such change. The problem with
such an analysis is that Rules become entrenched and cannot possibly
351
address the developments in practice. For example, Rule 1.5 on fees
has been in place since 1983 and has purported to govern issues relating
to all attorneys' fees. There is no doubt that billing practices have
changed dramatically in the last thirty years. Yet, the Rule stands
without substantial modification. Questions exist about hybrid fee
arrangements, expense account reimbursement, alternative financing
issues, and different ways in which law firms protect their fees. The
current ABA structures are not designed to learn about problems that
arise in practice, the harms that clients are exposed to, or the best
manner in which to design guidance in the attorneys' fees area.
In the last thirty years, there have been many prominent examples
of lawyers who have "over-lawyered" their interpretation of rules out of
client pressure and for their own financial gain. Some have argued that
Wilson Sonsini did this with the pretexting advice given to Hewlett
Packard,352 that Kaye Scholer did it with respect to the advice given to
Lincoln Savings,35 3 and that Vinson & Elkins LLP did it with regards to
Sharren Watkins and Enron.354 There are undoubtedly countless other
cases that have gone undiscovered. The lesson is that the ABA should
seek to obtain reliable and comprehensive information about how the
ethics Rules work in practice, should use such information in reform of
the Rules, and should lead the profession into following best practices
that are commensurate with the core values of lawyering.
When the ABA chooses to stay silent in an area that has undergone
substantial change in practice, lawyers and law firms choose to act
without consideration of the Rules. Such actions are made by individuals
who weigh costs and risks, as well as the consequences of being too
ethical. The result is a patchwork of disparate practices that treat
different clients in different ways in similar situations. This behavior
350. See supra Part III.
351.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2012).

352. See Miriam Hechler Baer, CorporatePolicing and Corporate Governance: What Can We
Learnfrom Hewlett-Packard'sPretextingScandal?, 77 U. CiNN. L. REV. 523, 528-31, 580 (2008).
353. See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, The Office of
Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuitof the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 985, 988-89, 1001 (1993).
354. See Eichenwald, supra note 148, at A19 (describing Vinson & Elkins LLP's reasons for
accepting as an engagement the internal investigation prompted at Enron by Watkins).
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becomes vested in a culture of lawyer customs that can be difficult to
change. Subsequent involvement by the ABA is unlikely to affect the
experience that lawyers develop in the absence of regulation. And, when
developments in the practice of law overshadow the regulatory system,
the ABA's Codes become obsolete.
Although the ABA has just completed a relatively modest revision
of the Model Rules with Ethics 20/20, the ABA should establish a new
independent structure to consider more substantial and fundamental
reform of the Model Rules as well as to the manner in which it regulates
the legal profession.355 It should embrace a comprehensive review of the
current provisions and a broad agenda for a systematic empirical study
of lawyer practices. 5 6 With meaningful reform of the drafting and
adoption process for ethics Rules of the profession, the ABA can
continue to be an influential force in shaping the regulation of American
lawyers in the modem legal profession.

355.
356.

See supra Part lV.
See supra Part rV.
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